The threat of on-chip AI hardware controls

Jai Vipra | CyberBRICS Fellow, Center for Technology and Society, FGV Direito Rio

Introduction

Computational infrastructure is one of the most important constraints on AI development. Chips used to train and run AI models are expensive to produce and supplied by an extraordinarily concentrated market via a complex international supply chain. 

Recently, governments have become concerned about the strategic value of AI. This strategic value has two dimensions: one, that AI can potentially function as a lever of innovation and economic development, creating an advantage for any country that controls it [1]. Two, that AI can provide direct defence or military advantage through its use in surveillance and weapons systems [2]. Separately, potential security risks can arise from the malfunctioning, misuse, or malicious use of AI. These considerations have led to the United States’ restrictions on the export of the most advanced AI chips to China [3].

Against this backdrop, some analysts have recommended a policy of intervening at the design and manufacturing stages of AI chips to include hardware modifications to achieve policy goals [4]. This policy – hereafter “hardware controls” – is specifically recommended as a way for the United States to maintain its advantage in advanced chip design technology in relation to China and the rest of the world. It is also discussed to ensure that the ultimate control over AI development remains with a government (de facto the US government) [5]. 

The fact that all the most advanced AI chips today use American technology at some point in their value chain would allow the US government to unilaterally impose hardware controls by making them a condition of export. Existing export controls on semiconductor technology follow this route as well, invoking the foreign direct product rule (a regulation under the US Department of Commerce) and using it to disallow any semiconductor manufacturing company anywhere in the world from serving any Chinese design company to make AI chips [6]. China has already initiated a dispute at the WTO against these export controls, accusing the United States of using export controls meant for global security and non-proliferation, in the service of commercial technological leadership [7].

Hardware controls are conceived as an extension of these export controls that would include the ability to monitor and modify the use to which AI chips are put. They can allow a third party to monitor the kind and level of usage for a given chip or a cluster of chips; they can also allow them to remotely shut down the functioning of chips and therefore of an AI system [8]. In a sense, hardware controls are a kind of technological protection measure (TPM) [9], but unlike well-known applications of TPMs like paywalls, read-only controls, and watermarks, they are not being proposed (at least overtly) primarily for the protection of commercial interests through intellectual property. As we shall see, they might end up primarily protecting intellectual property for commercial reasons anyway.

The primary justifications provided for hardware controls include making chips “secure” and “governable” [10]. Sastry et al. (2024) mention some risks related to hardware controls, in particular the risks of security, privacy, and abuse of power [11]. They also contend that some risks, especially those affecting national security, might be so large as to call for ex-ante measures like hardware controls. This article challenges this primacy of national security and provides an analysis of the problems presented by hardware controls, even if they were to be safeguarded from data security and privacy harm. 

Problems posed by hardware controls

Undue surveillance and government control

It is well-known that government control over certain aspects of technology can lead to a function creep – the extension of a law, rule, or technology beyond its intended purpose [12]. For instance, facial recognition technology can be introduced to police departments as a tool to find missing children, but soon ends up being used for mass surveillance [13]. Effective hardware controls would make it possible and perhaps even easy for governments to monitor and shut down any computing activity that is considered inconvenient or dangerous. This can include even normal commercial activity under a state that favours certain corporations over others. 

Commercial control

The latter concern above is one of the over-regulations of commercial computing activity. A certain degree of openness in both software and hardware has been, and continues to be, crucial to computational progress. Bob Young, then CEO of open-source software provider Red Hat, noted in the introduction to ardent open-source advocate Eric Raymond’s influential 1991 book The Cathedral and the Bazaar that the computer hardware industry innovated much faster than the computer software industry because hardware was freer [14]. In contrast, software controls like digital rights management (DRM) have created locked consumers in to certain providers by making moving to another provider onerous, concentrated various markets (especially in entertainment), and led to obsolescence and the impossibility of preserving “protected” intellectual material [15]. 

Regulation is not well-suited to determine where exactly in the supply chain open source might add most value. The concepts of hardware freedom and free and open source hardware (FOSH) have served as a rallying call around the concerns of government overreach and inappropriate propertization of hardware technology [16]. Some developers have even coalesced around somewhat similar ideas in the realm of chips, under the Free and Open Source Silicon Foundation [17]. The “right to repair” movement also responds to the closedness of devices and the loss of consumer control over the use of devices [18].

This is not to say that the opposite of hardware controls is open hardware; however, central to the vision of proponents of hardware controls is a system of temporary licences that allow the hardware provider, or a third party, to determine the purpose and manner of hardware use.  

Efforts to limit the use of products once they are sold have been controversial. In The End of Ownership (2016), law professors Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz describe the erosion of personal property in the digital age, with providers of goods and services arguing that licensing allows them to arbitrarily delete or control the goods and services provided [19]. Instituting hardware controls means that chip designers, fabricators, and/or the US government will be able to determine the purposes and manner in which advanced AI chips are used. This creates entirely arbitrary restrictions on the ability of commercial or even academic entities to train AI models in the direction they seek. In the context of a very concentrated AI market, such controls do not bode well for new competitors and consequently for innovation.

Distrust in international relations

Importantly, some researchers consider the concentration in hardware markets desirable because it makes these markets easier to regulate, prevents a reckless race in hardware development, and preserves US hegemony over advanced computation. Certainly not everyone shares this desire for US hegemony, and the implications of one government determining what the entire world can do in terms of advanced AI training are not discussed, but these implications are wide-ranging [20]. For this reason alone it is important to counter these efforts. However, the same researchers also claim that hardware controls can “widen the space of possible [international] agreements and policies by providing a trustworthy verification platform” [21]. “Trustworthy” here is used in a technical sense: countries could potentially mutually monitor AI training activity in one another’s territory and use hardware controls to “trust” their own monitoring. 

The larger question of trust is ignored in this hypothetical. If the United States can unilaterally impose hardware controls on advanced chips, there is no manner of verifying that it also does not manufacture (or allow to be manufactured) chips that cannot be monitored, or that it does not create backdoors to monitoring known only to itself. There is an even larger question of trust in international relations: in an environment of intense rivalry between the US and China, and plummeting faith in the rules-based international order in the Global South, unilateral actions aimed at depriving other countries of advanced general technology can hardly be expected to increase trust. International relations scholars have shown that trust is a precondition for international agreements rather than a result of them [22]. A cycle of misperceptions about the motives and actions of rivals in AI governance is already underway, threatening strategic stability [23]. Trust-building measures, in both the rationally calculated and emotive senses [24], must occur before an international agreement on AI governance is arrived at. 

Industrial policy is a legitimate goal, but US export controls on AI chips, as well as proposed hardware controls, conflate national security goals with industrial policy goals. This is a general characteristic of The US AI policy so far, which has not followed the US government’s general approach of distancing industrial policy from national champions [25].

The promotion of delinking

One consequence of growing mistrust in international relations is the delinking of technological systems. Biden’s February 2024 Executive Order to “protect Americans’ sensitive personal data” explicitly targets China’s AI development [26]. Russia and China already have independent digital markets and infrastructure, and all three countries have banned the use of some types of foreign technology in government work. After the US implemented export controls on advanced chips, China accused it of “unilateral bullying” [27]. While US Secretary of State Antony Blinken later stated that the export control measures were not meant to impede China’s progress, China has understood these measures as an imprimatur to develop its own advanced chip technology. It has since taken several steps to develop domestic capability for chip design and production, and has succeeded in important respects [28]. This success has come in spite of expert predictions that it would be nearly impossible with escalating export controls [29]. 

In the US, China’s successes in overcoming some aspects of export controls are used by many commentators to argue for further export controls, and indeed the call for hardware controls is an example of such a push. Here, we ought to examine an assumption that drives these calls – AI is economically and strategically useful, and so the US must limit China’s chip development. However, if AI is quite that economically and strategically useful, China will have extremely high incentives to dramatically increase investments in chip development if the US tries to restrict chip technology exports to China from all countries. In trying to restrict China’s access to advanced chips, the US might be spurring on China’s own delinked chip industry.

In addition, other countries are learning from this example and investing in their own semiconductor industries and in international projects to stave off geopolitical risk at least partially. Various countries including the US have been active in developing RISC-V, an open-source project for an instruction set architecture (ISA) - an interface between hardware and software used by chip designers. Using an open-source ISA reduces dependence on licensed ISA providers like Arm and Intel, and therefore India, China and the EU have been trying to advance its development [30]. All these actors consider such open-source projects as important for digital sovereignty.  

Delinking is not objectively undesirable. Paris Marx (2024) envisions a collective splinternet, without massive global platforms and with interoperability and open protocols [31]. Such a system would make regulation more striaghtforward because it does not pit single nation-states against global platforms. Parallel AI development in various parts of the world might prevent the rise and entrenchment of global corporate AI giants, make regulation easier for governments, and provide choices for consumers. Hardware controls intend to preclude such possibilities entirely, trying to leave the world with only US AI giants being able to develop advanced AI.

In any case, as argued earlier, hardware controls might render themselves ineffective by increasing incentives for delinking and growth in the semiconductor industries of target countries. While their primary purpose may be unfulfilled, their function creep will remain – the increased ability of governments to surveil individuals and corporations, and the increased ability of corporations to control hardware. 

Resisting hardware controls 

We have seen that there are compelling reasons to resist hardware controls. Unlike open-source projects of the past, in this case it is quite difficult for such resistance to arise from a dissident group of programmers. The semiconductor industry is highly concentrated, has heavily guarded intellectual property, and chip production requires enormous amounts of money [32]. Even the most successful open-source projects of the past have faced challenges due to illegality [33]. It is therefore incumbent upon policymakers and civil society to resist the implementation of these hardware controls in the first place. 

Once implemented, hardware controls will likely fail to reach their original objectives (some of which are not necessarily desirable), and can entrench government and corporate control over hardware. AI research is already concentrated in industry rather than academia, and government interests in AI are not always aligned with public interests in AI. Policymakers must look beyond short-term and vague fears over national security and consider the broader implications of hardware controls.

Endnotes

1. Amba Kak and Sarah Myers West, ‘A Modern Industrial Strategy for AI?: Interrogating the US Approach’, AI Nationalism(s) (AI Now Institute, 12 March 2024), https://ainowinstitute.org/publication/a-modern-industrial-strategy-for-aiinterrogating-the-us-approach.

2. Vincent Boulanin et al., ‘Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk’ (SIPRI, June 2020), https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/policy-reports/artificial-intelligence-strategic-stability-and-nuclear-risk.; AI Now Institute, ‘US-China AI Race: AI Policy as Industrial Policy’, 11 April 2023, https://ainowinstitute.org/publication/us-china-ai-race.

3. Gregory C. Allen, ‘Choking off China’s Access to the Future of AI’ (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10 November 2022), https://www.csis.org/analysis/choking-chinas-access-future-ai.

4. Onni Arne, Tim Fist, and Caleb Withers, ‘Secure, Governable Chips’ (Center for a New American Security, 8 January 2024), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/secure-governable-chips; Luke Muehlhauser, ‘12 Tentative Ideas for US AI Policy | Open Philanthropy’, Open Philanthropy (blog), 17 April 2023, https://www.openphilanthropy.org/research/12-tentative-ideas-for-us-ai-policy/.; Gabriel Kulp et al., ‘Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms: Developing Technical Solutions to Exempt Items Otherwise Classified Under Export Control Classification Numbers 3A090 and 4A090’ (RAND Corporation, 18 January 2024), https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA3056-1.html.

5. Ibid.

6. Gregory C. Allen.

7. World Trade Organization, ‘China Initiates WTO Dispute Complaint Targeting US Semiconductor Chip Measures’, 15 December 2022, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/ds615rfc_15dec22_e.htm.

8. Onni Aarne et al. 

9. A TPM is a technical tool that allows a provider or third party to restrict the kinds and levels of use of digital materials. Access-control TPMs include time limits like for digital movie rentals among other measures, and copy-control TPMs include, for instance, blocking downloads of streaming content. See for more: ‘Technological Protection Measures (TPM) - Fact Sheet | SFU Library’, Simon Fraser University, 2023, https://www.lib.sfu.ca/help/academic-integrity/copyright/technological-protection-measures. 

10. Onni Aarne et al.

11. Girish Sastry et al., ‘Computing Power and the Governance of Artificial Intelligence’ (arXiv, 13 February 2024), https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2402.08797.

12. Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘The Concept of Function Creep’, Law, Innovation and Technology 13, no. 1 (2 January 2021): 29–56, https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2021.1898299.

13. Jai Vipra, ‘The Use of Facial Recognition Technology for Policing in Delhi’ (New Delhi: Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, 16 August 2021), https://vidhilegalpolicy.in/research/the-use-of-facial-recognition-technology-for-policing-in-delhi/. 

14. Bob Young, ‘Introduction’, in The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by an Accidental Revolutionary, by Eric S. Raymond, revised edition (O’Reilly, 2001).

15. ‘DRM and the Secret War inside Your Devices’, in The End of Ownership: Personal Property in the Digital Economy, by Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz (The MIT Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/10524.001.0001.

16. See for instance: ‘Our Mission | FreeIO’, accessed 4 May 2024, http://freeio.org/about-freeio/our-mission/.

17. See: ‘FOSSi Foundation: The International Not for Profit Organisation Which Promotes and Protects the Open Source Silicon Chip Movement’, accessed 4 May 2024, https://fossi-foundation.org/.

18. See: ‘Learn About the Right to Repair’, The Repair Association, accessed 2 May 2024, https://www.repair.org/stand-up.

19. Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz, The End of Ownership: Personal Property in the Digital Economy (The MIT Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/10524.001.0001.

20. Meredith Whittaker, ‘Social Media, Authoritarianism, and the World As It Is’, LPE Project (blog), 28 March 2024, https://lpeproject.org/blog/social-media-authoritarianism-and-the-world-as-it-is/.

21. Onni Aarne et al.

22. Brian C. Rathbun, Trust in International Cooperation: International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and American Multilateralism, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 121 (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 

23. Anna Nadibaidze and Nicolò Miotto, ‘The Impact of AI on Strategic Stability Is What States Make of It: Comparing US and Russian Discourses’, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 6, no. 1 (2 January 2023): 47–67, https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2023.2205552.

24. Torsten Michel, ‘Time to Get Emotional: Phronetic Reflections on the Concept of Trust in International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 4 (December 2013): 869–90, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066111428972. 

25. Amba Kak and Sarah Myers West.

26. Griffin, Riley, and Jennifer Jacobs. ‘Biden Poised to Limit American Personal Data Going to China’. Bloomberg.Com, 7 February 2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-07/biden-poised-to-restrict-americans-personal-data-going-to-china.

27. Swanson, Ana. ‘U.S. Tightens China’s Access to Advanced Chips for Artificial Intelligence’. The New York Times, 17 October 2023, sec. Business. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/17/business/economy/ai-chips-china-restrictions.html.

28. Patel, Dylan, Afzal Ahmad, and Myron Xie. ‘China AI & Semiconductors Rise: US Sanctions Have Failed’. SemiAnalysis (blog), 12 September 2023. https://www.semianalysis.com/p/china-ai-and-semiconductors-rise.

29. Gregory Allen.

30. Working group on open source hardware and software, ‘Recommendations and Roadmap for European Sovereignty on Open Source Hardware, Software and RISC-V Technologies | Shaping Europe’s Digital Future’, 8 September 2022, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/recommendations-and-roadmap-european-sovereignty-open-source-hardware-software-and-risc-v.; Press Information Bureau of India, ‘India Launches Digital India RISC-V (DIR-V) Program for next Generation Microprocessors to Achieve Commercial Silicon & Design Wins by December’2023’, 27 April 2022, https://pib.gov.in/pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1820621.; Stephen Nellis and Max A. Cherney, ‘RISC-V Technology Emerges as Battleground in US-China Tech War’, Reuters, 7 October 2023, https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-china-tech-war-risc-v-chip-technology-emerges-new-battleground-2023-10-06/. 

31. Paris Marx, ‘Embrace the Splinternet’, Disconnect (blog), 2 May 2024, https://disconnect.blog/embrace-the-splinternet/. 

32. Jai Vipra and Sarah Myers West, ‘Computational Power and AI’ (AI Now Institute, 27 September 2023), https://ainowinstitute.org/publication/policy/compute-and-ai. 

33. Christopher Tozzi, For Fun and Profit: A History of the Free and Open Source Software Revolution (The MIT Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/10803.001.0001.

Impacts of the Ban on Asylum Seekers' Employment

Yu Furukawa

Many countries with asylum processes have adopted policies which restrict the access of asylum seekers to the labour market. For example, in the UK, asylum seekers are largely prohibited from working, although they can apply for a permit to work if they have been awaiting a decision for 12 months and are not considered responsible for the delay [1]. Granting asylum seekers, a work permit means allowing them to engage in paid and formal employment either at the time of application or after a certain period has elapsed. The granting of work permits to asylum seekers takes various forms, primarily distinguished by:

1. The duration asylum seekers must wait for the work permit to be approved.

2. The presence of a list of job restrictions that asylum seekers are allowed to engage in.

I evaluate the validity of the argument that supporting the employment of asylum seekers working would act as a ‘pull factor,’ for migrants, and also assess the impacts to the economies of host societies, as well as the well-being and integration of those with asylum.

Debunking the 'Pull Factor' Assumption for Asylum Seeker Migration

The common argument against allowing asylum seekers to work is that it might serve as a 'pull factor' for undocumented migration and asylum applications. However, the validity of this argument is questionable because it lacks counterfactual analysis [2], thereby failing to account for the various other factors influencing undocumented migration and asylum applications. It could be argued that irregular migration and asylum applications would have increased even without the ban on asylum seekers working.

This argument is further challenged by the fact that some asylum applicants are unaware of the challenges they will face in the labour market prior to migration or asylum application. One study [3] showed that, out of 246 asylum seekers surveyed, 72% were unaware prior to arriving in the UK that asylum seekers are not allowed to work. This data suggests that other significant factors influence migratory decision making beyond knowledge of work permits, such as the presence of family members and migrant communities, and host language proficiency. Additionally, research indicates that asylum applications experience a negligible decrease if at all when the unemployment rate increases or when a ban on working is established. For instance, Zetter et al. (2003) [4] noted that restrictions on work and welfare were introduced in Germany during the 1980s, yet applications increased and peaked in 1992.

Therefore, viewing work permits for asylum seekers as a ‘pull factor’ mistakenly assumes that migrants possess comprehensive knowledge about their economic rights prior to their journey and overlooks more complex dynamics in migratory decision-making, such as household dynamics, historical context, and transnational networks. To grasp these complexities and identify the accurate 'pull factor' and 'push factor', the combination of counterfactual analysis and qualitative research in origin countries and along migratory routes is advisable [5]. Depending on migrants' circumstances and social factors, there may be cases where a work permit can become a 'pull factor'. However, at the very least, it is advisable to be skeptical towards claims that it is an absolute 'pull factor'.

Unless there is a change in the structural factors driving in undocumented migration, asylum seekers will continue to arrive, even if work permits are granted to asylum seekers. Therefore, while simultaneously considering policies aimed at reducing undocumented migration, such as expanding legal and safe migration pathways, it is more feasible to encourage the employment of asylum seekers and mitigate their burden on the social welfare system, as I will discuss later.

Another Form of “Illegality”: Undocumented Stay and Work After the Asylum Refusal

While it is doubtful or at best context-specific about whether work permits can be a ‘pull-factor’ for undocumented entry, the issuance of work permits can lead to other forms of undocumented behaviour. In other words, it may contribute to neglect of the option of voluntary or forced return (removal). Allowing asylum seekers to work could strengthen their ties to the host country and make the prospect of returning less appealing [6]. Consequently, they might remain in the country even after their asylum claims have been rejected, without any legal authorization for residence or work.

This situation is sometimes addressed through the implementation of policies such as the one introduced in Sweden, where work permits are exchanged for a commitment to return in the event of asylum refusal [7]. By ensuring cooperation regarding return in the event of failed asylum claims, individuals can secure a work permit during the asylum process. This measure serves to deter undocumented stays and work following the refusal of asylum.

Economic Impacts

The economic impacts of allowing asylum seekers to enter the formal sector need to be evaluated from two perspectives: (i) the extent to which asylum seekers will make fiscal contributions to host societies and (ii) the extent to which the inflow of asylum seekers into the labour market will create competition with native workers. Asylum seeker participation in the labour market may yield short-term economic benefits. Lift the Ban (2020) [8] estimates that if half of asylum seekers awaiting asylum decisions for over six months were allowed to work full-time at the national average wage, the British government could gain £73.1 million annually from their tax and national insurance contributions. However, it is important to consider the degree to which asylum seekers will make net fiscal contributions, paying more in taxes than the costs of providing them with welfare benefits and public services. Given that refugees are less likely to make fiscal contributions than other migrants [9], asylum seekers are likely to follow the same trend.

Another aspect to consider is that granting work permits to asylum seekers may negatively impact native workers' employment and wages by creating competition between them. Braun and Mahmoud (2014) [10] found reduced native employment due to inflows of East German migrants to West Germany post-World War II. Also, Bahar et al. (2021) [11] observed negligible labour market effects in Colombia following a large-scale amnesty program for undocumented Venezuelan migrants, except for minor impacts on formal employment.  While these case studies do not specifically address asylum seeker situations, they can provide a rationale for governments to limit job options for asylum seekers and regulate the influx of asylum seekers into specific labour markets. Directing asylum seekers toward sectors facing labour shortages and where competition with native workers is unlikely might help mitigate adverse effects on the employment and wages of native workers.

However, the ability of asylum seekers to work does not always have a negative impact on native workers. This is because it depends on how many asylum seekers end up working. Asylum seekers often have difficulty finding a job and earning wages that are correspondent to their educational levels. According to a survey conducted by Lift the Ban (2020), 74% of respondents (UK asylum seekers) have secondary-level education or higher, and 37% have a university degree, which is only 5% lower than that of the rest of the UK [12]. Despite their educational attainment, they struggle to secure employment opportunities. According to the same survey, of the thirty-six people who applied for work permits after waiting for over 12 months, only eight were granted permission, and only two of them managed to find employment afterwards [13].

This result resonates with larger-scale data in 2022 from the Migration Observatory, which indicates that non-EU-born asylum seekers in the UK were more likely to be unemployed than those who migrated for employment, family, or study. While the unemployment rate among the former was 12%, it ranged among the latter from 2 to 6 per cent [14]. Moreover, even if asylum seekers secure employment, it takes time for them to earn wages commensurate with their educational level or equivalent to other types of migrants. For example, research shows that while the employment gap between asylum seekers and other types of migrants converges over time, those in weekly earnings and hourly wages do not narrow [15].

In sum, although granting work permits to asylum seekers may cause competition between them and native workers, it is crucial to keep in mind that asylum seekers would struggle to find a job. Therefore, how many asylum seekers will end up working and how much fiscal contribution they will make should be considered.

Psychological and Social Impact

Access to the labour market can have a positive impact on the mental health of asylum seekers. Asylum seekers often experience insecurity about their future and a sense of being stuck due to pending asylum cases. However, engaging in purposeful activities such as work might help them address these concerns [16]. Being able to work may facilitate the integration of asylum seekers including economic dependence, the improvement of living standards and social integration [17]. One study [18], through its interviews with refugees and migrants in the UK, demonstrated that most of them (the exact number was not specified) view work as a key component of integration. They perceive work as enabling them to establish the foundation for their livelihood. While the data presented is not solely limited to asylum seekers, it would be reasonable to assume that the findings also apply to asylum seekers.

Furthermore, granting work permits to asylum seekers can have a positive impact on other elements of integration such as the acquisition of language skills, and cultural values. For example, one survey [19] asked 207 migrants about the place where they learn the most about the British community and values, with 43% saying from the workplace, 15% from neighbourhood and community, and 15% from mainstream media. Here, it is crucial to consider how temporal and cumulative impact the integration of asylum seekers into the workforce. As Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2021) [20] argue, when asylum seekers face prolonged periods with limited access to jobs, their economic integration slows down.

Marbach et al. (2017) [21] conducted a study in Germany where a court decision led to a shorter employment ban period. They found that, five years after the waiting period was reduced, refugees who initially had to wait an extra seven months before entering the job market had employment rates about 20 percentage points lower. In this sense, it is advisable to allow asylum seekers to work at an early stage of their application if governments want to facilitate the successful integration of asylum workers into society

Conclusion

Viewing work permits for asylum seekers as a ‘pull-factor’ for undocumented migration and asylum applications overlooks situations where other factors play more significant roles. The exact effect of work permits, and the complex dynamics of migratory decision-making require counterfactual and qualitative analysis. To evaluate its economic impact, it is imperative to consider how many asylum seekers will end up working and how much fiscal contribution they will make. Regarding psychological and integration aspects, access to the labour market can have a favourable impact on asylum seekers' mental health and facilitate their integration into society if they are permitted to work early in the application process.

References

1. Gower, M., McKinney, C. and Meade, L. (2019). Should asylum seekers have unrestricted rights to work in the UK? UK Parliament [online] Available at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn01908/.

2. Walsh, P.W. and Sumption, M. (2023). UK policies to deter people from claiming asylum. [online] Migration Observatory. Available at: https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/uk-policies-to-deter-people-from-claiming-asylum/.

3. Lift the Ban (2020). Lift the ban: Why giving people seeking asylum the right to work is common sense. London: Lift the Ban Coalition.

4. Roger Zetter, David Griffiths, Silva Ferretti, Martyn Pearl (2003) ‘An Assessment of the Impact of Asylum Policies in Europe 1990- 2000’, Home Office Research Study 259;

5. Walsh and Sumption supra reference 2.

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8. Lift the Ban supra reference 3.

9. Migration Observatory. (2023). Why the government’s economic Impact Assessment of the Illegal Migration Act tells us little about the Act’s economic impact. [online] Available at: https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/why-the-governments-economic-impact-assessment-of-the-illegal-migration-act-tells-us-little-about-the-acts-economic-impact/.

10. Braun, S. and Omar Mahmoud, T. (2014). The Employment Effects of Immigration: Evidence from the Mass Arrival of German Expellees in Postwar Germany. The Journal of Economic History, 74(1), pp.69–108. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022050714000035.

11. Bahar, D., Ibáñez, A.M. and Rozo, S.V. (2021). Give me your tired and your poor: Impact of a large-scale amnesty program for undocumented refugees. Journal of Development Economics, 151, p.102652. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2021.102652.

12. Lift the Ban supra reference 3.

13. Lift the Ban supra reference 3.

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15. Ruiz, I. and Vargas-Silva, C. (2017). Differences in Labour Market Outcomes between Natives, Refugees and Other Migrants in the UK. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2920574.

16. Burnett, A. and Ndovi, T. (2018). The health of forced migrants. BMJ, p.k4200. doi:https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.k4200.

17. Kierans, D. (2021). Integration in the UK: Understanding the Data. [online] Migration Observatory. Available at: https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/reports/integration-in-the-uk-understanding-the-data/.

18. Rutter, J., Latorre, M., and Sriskandarajah, D. (2008). Beyond naturalisation: citizenship policy in an age of super mobility, London: IPPR.

19. Migrants Resource Centre. (2018). Integrated Communities Strategy: MRC submission of evidence and response to the government green paper consultation

20. Ruiz, I. and Vargas-Silva, C. (2021). What Works for Improving Refugee Outcomes in High-Income Countries? Policy Insights for the UK. [online] The Centre on Migration, Policy & Society (COMPAS). Available at: https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/What-Works-for-Improving-Refugee-Outcomes-in-High-Income-Countries-Policy-Insights-for-the-UK.pdf.

21. Marbach, M., Hainmueller, J. and Hangartner, D. (2017). The Long-Term Impact of Employment Bans on the Economic Integration of Refugees. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3078172.

Canada and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

michael levinson | News Editor

Former Canadian Senator Douglas Roche spoke bluntly on Canada’s refusal to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). “No wonder Canada didn’t get elected to the UN Security Council.”

Roche echoes a growing refrain that includes the New Democratic Party (NDP), Green Party, Bloc Québécois, as well as notable Canadian politicians such as Lloyd Axworthy and Jean Chrétien, all urging Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to sign the treaty. But Trudeau remains defiant. He deemed the UN conference which devised it “sort of useless,” instructed Canada’s UN delegation to boycott the negotiations, and continually asserts that Canada’s NATO membership precludes its participation.

Is it unbecoming for Canada — the nation which spearheaded the movement to ban anti-personnel landmines and one of the most steadfast historical advocates for non-proliferation — to resist these pressures? Seventy-three percent of Canadians think so. But even for doves, the answer should be “no”.

The TPNW’s ban on nuclear weapons does not serve Canadian interests because it would weaken the US’ ability to deter nuclear threats that protects Canadians and democracies at large. Research suggests that when leaders ignore the TPNW it does little to quell public pressures to sign. Trudeau should plainly address Canadians and set the record straight. He should acknowledge that the broad-based effort to ban nuclear weapons is well-intentioned but falls short due to its potential to limit deterrence mechanisms that have helped avoid a nuclear winter. Finally, Trudeau should explain that an outright ban helps even the field for revisionist powers such as North Korea to take advantage of a potential nuclear void.

In this new kind of prisoner’s dilemma, the TPNW places a greater onus on democratic states to disarm than authoritarian ones. But ‘taking the high road’ is not admirable — it is reckless. Canada must instead regain credibility on disarmament by focusing its efforts on encouraging the US, China, and Russia to come together directly and negotiate a multilateral agreement to reduce nuclear arsenals.

The TPNW, which entered into force in 2021, aims to stigmatize nuclear weapons to the point where they no longer pose a viable threat. To achieve this, state parties agree to never develop, transfer, or in any way encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Those that already have nuclear weapons must work towards their “irreversible elimination.” 

The TPNW can be seen as a good faith but idealistic way to deal with frustrations regarding the flagship treaty on nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). A product of détente during the Cold War, the NPT permits the five UN Security Council veto states — the US, UK, France, China, and Russia — to keep their nuclear stockpiles with certain restraints. The rest give up their right to nuclear weapons entirely and agree to specific safeguards on nuclear energy. The NPT has been successful in limiting proliferation; there is an adage that most states comply with their treaty obligations most of the time. Overall, the NPT has made it less appealing and more difficult to acquire nuclear weapons.

But the pace of nuclear disarmament has been abysmal. The US and Russia have a combined 11,000 nuclear warheads, enough to end the world many times over. However, “if the sole goal of the global nuclear order were to avoid nuclear use, the obvious solution would be abolition.” Rather, nuclear-armed states believe nuclear weapons provide security in a challenging strategic environment. For instance, Canada’s involvement in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and NATO, place it firmly within the US’ nuclear umbrella. Security guarantees, like those given to Canada by the US, have been shown to reduce the possibility of a state otherwise acquiring weapons on their own. While the NPT still espouses complete disarmament as a goal, it is premised on the idea that a nuclear hierarchy among states, or a global nuclear order, “has done its part to help keep the world from going over the precipice.”

Some supporters of the TPNW maintain that though opposition to the treaty is predictable, its overall effect is to give rise to a ‘nuclear taboo’ that will become so powerful it will soon be customary international law. If this is the primary mechanism through which the world gives up on nuclear politics entirely, it is doomed to fail. Customary international law (which applies to all states irrespective of treaty obligations) does not develop simply when a practice is widespread. For it to materialize, it must also satisfy opinion juris: meaning a state is engaging in that practice because it is believed to be international law. As Chatham House opined, “this is far from an automatic process […] even if a rule is indeed created, states that have objected to a certain degree to its emergence — so-called persistent objectors — will not be bound by it.”

Other supporters of the TPNW concede that while achieving a complete ban of nuclear weapons is unlikely, a universal treaty that is not accepted by nuclear-weapons states is better than none. The University of Melbourne’s Maria Rost Rublee, for instance, argues that while the landmine ban treaty has not been ratified by the US, the US has not deployed them for two decades. In that case, the normative power of the treaty has superseded its lack of universality.

But landmines are different from nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have not been used in war since 1945, their catastrophic effects are increasingly understood, mutually assured destruction looms large, and they are rarely embedded in conventional forces. Writing about Russia’s recent nuclear threats to Ukraine, Alexander Bollfrass said “fortunately, the foundation of international nuclear governance is more robust than is often assumed.” The NPT, for example, is complemented by various arms-control agreements, extended deterrence arrangements, and expectations of negative reinforcements like sanctions if nuclear norms are violated.

Given no nuclear-armed states have signed the TPNW, it will only serve to limit deterrence in practice. And as authoritarian states such as Russia and China are more immune to public pressures than democracies, it will primarily affect Western states’ deterrence capabilities. North Korea seems to have recognized this, voting in favour of establishing a formal UN mandate to commence negotiations for the TPNW in 2016. Kim Jong Un is taking advantage of our democratic processes — he is playing the West for a fool.

In several NATO countries, over 75% of respondents said they support the TPNW. If this support is translated in the ballot box, leaders will eventually give in. What would that mean? Contrary to what Justin Trudeau has claimed, there is a growing body of research showing that NATO members are not barred from signing the TPNW but must commit to giving up nuclear weapons stationed in their territory. So if a NATO member becomes a party to the TPNW, it would have to forfeit key defensive arrangements. Turkey, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, for example, all host US warheads. While housing these weapons in Europe is a relic of Cold War strategy, “withdrawing them would send a dangerous message of U.S. retrenchment to would-be adversaries in Europe and beyond.” And as the war in Ukraine continues, some say that the weapons can be used as leverage in negotiations with Russia.

Further, although Canada does not house nuclear weapons, the TPNW’s prohibition of its members to “assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party,” may undermine Canada’s involvement in NORAD. The NORAD air defense agreement is premised on the fact that regardless of the speed of the disarmament process, “large nuclear arsenals still exist, deliverable by strategic ballistic missile, cruise missile or long-range aircraft capable of striking North America.” This fundamentally practical alliance will be effectively destroyed by signing the TPNW.

Increasing public pressure on democracies to sign the TPNW also comes at a time when North Korea is testing longer-range ballistic missiles, Iran remains a threshold power on the precipice of a bomb, China is developing its nuclear triad, and Russia is modernizing its strategic nuclear capabilities with state-of-the-art hypersonic glide vehicles. It is unwise to cede the upper hand. To re-establish Canada’s credibility on nuclear disarmament while avoiding the TPNW, therefore, Trudeau should encourage the US, China, and Russia to come together directly and negotiate a multilateral agreement to reduce nuclear arsenals. Or, as was suggested for Japan (which is facing similar pressures to sign), Trudeau should make it a priority to invest heavily in a specific aspect of nuclear security, such as improving safeguards on nuclear energy.

Whatever the response, Trudeau must not ignore the TPNW — it is here to stay and is only gaining more momentum. It would also be prudent to continue to engage with UN conferences and TPNW meetings to further demonstrate Canada’s continued commitment to multilateralism.

That means embracing Canada’s diplomatic tradition, responsibly.

Empowering India's Sustainable Development: The Crucial Role of Hemp

Khushi Maheshwari and Pratham Maheshwari

Humanity continues to endure catastrophic environmental damage. 2023 was the warmest year on record by far and the Doomsday clock is set at just 90 seconds to midnight. In such dire circumstances, even a glimmering hope can prove to be a blessing. Indeed, hope can be found at the literal grassroots in the form of a surprising commodity - hemp - in the world’s most populous country, India.

Hemp’s value can be best realized in a country best suited to become a world leader in its wider proliferation: India. Hemp has 25,000 proven applications ranging from textiles to food. It also flourishes without a heavy reliance on pesticides and fertilizers, and overall is a relatively low maintenance, and therefore agriculturally cost-effective, crop. Hemp can yield 3-8 tones of fiber in a single acre, 4 times that of an average forest while producing 25 times more oxygen. It is also a carbon-negative crop that absorbs carbon dioxide from the environment, with each kilogram of hemp absorbing 1.8-2 kilograms of carbon dioxide. It requires less than half the amount of water required to produce cotton, and rather than absorbing nutrients from the soil, hemp returns 60-70% of nutrients to the soil, promoting its future fertility. Hemp is also blessed with a brief crop cycle of approximately 12 weeks. One of the strongest natural fibers, hemp textile fiber is known to be biodegradable, hypoallergenic, antimicrobial, porous, durable, breathable, and comfortable, and can also help to regulate body temperature as it facilitates air to circulate around our skin when compared to other fabrics.

The global hemp fiber market is expected to reach 26 billion dollars by 2026 and the global medical hemp market is projected to exceed 82 billion dollars during the ensuing year. Capturing such a rapidly growing market and becoming a global leader in the industry  could do wonders for India. Hemp production is greatly needed to address issues such as unemployment, water scarcity, and limited availability of land; in the latter case, hemp has been heralded as a pristine candidate to repair damaged Indian soil through the process of phytoremediation.

Moreover, the use of hemp has roots in Ayurveda, a school of Indian alternative medicine. In the counterpart school of Atharvaveda, hemp is considered one of the five most sacred plants. Hemp was widely used in ancient India due to its medicinal and nutritional value. It was also used in textiles and even as hempcrete to construct the famous Ellora Caves, which has prevented their degradation for 1500 years. 

The regulation of hemp in India began during the colonial era when cannabis was restricted across British colonies. The Indian Hemp Drugs Commission (1894-1895) criminalized and suppressed cannabis cultivation and processing. Currently, hemp is regulated by the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, of 1985, which was passed by the Rajiv Gandhi administration under the influence of the American Reagan administration for over two decades. The act legally defined hemp as cannabis due to the taxonomical origin of hemp flowers from the same family of plants as marijuana. This proved an impetus for taboos, myths, and misconceptions about hemp. Hemp, however, crucially lacks the psychoactive effects of marijuana when consumed. Marijuana arises from a female Sativa plant containing psychoactive tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) that is consumed for recreational purposes. Hemp contains less than 0.3% THC. Still, the narrative of suspicion persists in the minds of Indian consumers.

The peculiar intensity of the Indian taboo against hemp is evinced by the country’s seemingly contradictory relationship to bhang, a plant prepared from the seeds and leaves of the cannabis plant, which is legal in India. Regulated by some states, it is used as a form of medicine and also enjoyed in festivals. Its origins trace back thousands of years when Cannabis Indica was used to worship Lord Shiva. A plausible explanation is that bhang is shielded from disrepute by its holy connotations. In a country imbued with strongly held religious beliefs and a strong commitment by many to India’s unique and storied traditions, hemp has slipped through the cracks, its rich heritage tainted by a perception imported from colonizers.

COP 28 recognised significant Indian environmental achievements, including progress toward a 33% reduction in emissions and the achievement of Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) targets 11 years ahead of schedule. India has also greatly expanded its electric grid capacity, sourcing 80% from non-petrocarbon resources. However, COP 28 had nary a whisper about hemp. India is a land of manufacturers and businessmen who can capitalise on hemp, advancing environmental targets, bringing attendant international renown to India, and thereby building a pivotal point for India by making it a sustainable land and potentially generating a trillion dollar market for the Indian economy.

Legalization could be a first, normative, and positive step. Stereotypes must be combated by educating communities and spreading awareness. With widespread cultivation, India would not only benefit from an environmental surplus but also achieve economies of scale. A rational approach to structural change must, in this case, start at the top. However, the relationship between social narratives and policymaking is frustratingly circular, requiring courageous effort to break the chain of stigma and suppression of a potentially vital industry.