How Do Rebellions Succeed or Fail?

john connor

The panoply of factors affecting the success or failure of any single rebellion and the sheer number of rebellions throughout history makes identifying independent causes of success or failure a daunting task. Nevertheless, the challenge is worth accepting; once such overall causes are identified, other facets of rebellion – the role of atrocity, the causes of rebellion, or what elements must be present to start a rebellion – may be seen in a clearer light. 

“Rebellion”, in this essay, will be defined as an armed attempt to overthrow or expel the state by non-state actors, as with U.S. joint military doctrine’s characterization of insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict” [1]. While some rebellions may seek simply to overthrow a government, some may regard the state itself as illegitimate. For the purposes of greater precision, this study excludes military coups, conflict involving organized crime (such as Mexico’s cartel conflict), or nonviolent state takeover by elite factions. This can help us achieve greater analytical precision as we proceed. 

This essay argues that rebellions can succeed in one of two ways: first, by achieving political concessions through a complete takeover of the state, or second, by state acquiescence to rebel demands. Neither scenario necessarily requires military victory. Both scenarios require four components - a weakened state, a partly sympathetic or neutral population, effective material and financial support, and a rebel movement capable of gaining some degree of legitimacy to administer a state, and material and financial support. It is important to note for the sake of clarity that sympathy is different from legitimacy; the former involves simple support for a rebellion’s ideals, while the latter involves recognizing it as a credible governing alternative to the state. 

Numerous other factors ranging from charismatic leadership to the presence of cross-border activity may strongly influence outcomes but do not necessarily have to be present for success. The path to success is also complicated by whether a rebellion involves domestic or expeditionary counterinsurgency by the state. Failure is possible through a lack of one of the essential components in either scenario, or because of other factors – it is easier for a rebellion to fail than succeed due to the state’s inherent asymmetric advantage over rebel movements. While the state always possesses a preexisting military, access to funds through taxation, and a governing structure, rebels must develop their own armed forces, political organization, and means of funding. One example of asymmetry is that state militaries will commonly possess superior technology and training to insurgents. This imbalance is often difficult but by no means impossible to overcome. 

Defining Success

Carl Von Clausewitz observed that war is “simply the continuation of policy by other means” [2]. Policy, for the rebel movements, means demands. These are not necessarily the same as the deep-seated structural grievances which cause revolts in the first place. Rather, they comprise the stated political objectives of the rebel movement. Success involves achieving these demands. This may fall along a wide spectrum from complete success (an example being American revolutionaries achieving independence) to complete failure (the destruction of Nat Turner’s rebellion and the subsequent imposition of even harsher slave laws) [3] to numerous gray zones in between. Success and failure, therefore, do not constitute a simple binary. There is no precise number of concessions to be gained that can make an insurgency an unqualified “success”. By placing individual insurgencies along a range rather than sorting them into discrete categories, we can avoid the problems that emerge when attempting to subsume the nuances of individual rebellions under rigid categorical guidelines. 

The success of insurgents in imposing their political goals is often, but not always, accompanied by military success. Like political success, military success falls along a wide spectrum, not necessarily corresponding to the spectrum of political success. At one end of the spectrum is complete victory – i.e., the expulsion of the enemy from the territory the rebels seek to control, or the destruction of the state and its replacement with a rebel regime; however, military victory can also occur in a more negative sense (exhausting and outlasting the state until it withdraws). At the other end of the spectrum, political success may still be achieved despite military defeat – Algeria is an excellent example. During the Algerian War of Independence, France mostly crushed an armed insurrection, only to give Algeria its independence after realizing that the colonial regime was unsustainable. Clausewitz further observed that war is “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will” [4]; in insurgency, the rebel has multiple paths to fulfilling their will, of which acts of violence are only one. 

Scenario One: Complete State Takeover

The first necessary factor is weakened state presence in the area of the insurgency. Insurgency is asymmetric by nature, and any state which completely succumbs to it must have existing problems of a political or military nature. Political problems often center around perceived lack of state legitimacy, which may be exacerbated by poor state control over remote areas (such as Pakistan’s tribal regions) [5], a proliferation of armed non-state actors (such as Lebanon’s sectarian militias) [6] and corruption [7]. Extant traditions of rebellion (such as Mali’s repeated Tuareg rebellions) [8] and the presence of minorities incorporated into the state against their will (such as Palestinians in the Israeli occupied West Bank and Gaza during the First Intifada of 1987-1993) may also create fertile conditions for insurgency. Colonial states faced unique political challenges due to the difficulty of convincing their subjects to accept the legitimacy of an occupying power, in addition to the task of frequently administering vast geographic areas through small colonial bureaucracies. Factors affecting a weakened state presence frequently overlap with factors affecting military weakness: remote terrain or geographic distance between a state and its colony can reduce state military capacity, and military corruption can result in poorly equipped troops and low morale (as seen in the Nigerian military’s campaign against Boko Haram) [9]. 

The second necessary factor is a primarily sympathetic or neutral population. Neutrality is more important than sympathy; T.E. Lawrence, an influential figure in the study of counterinsurgency [10], claimed that only 2% of a population needed to be actively sympathetic for an insurgency to succeed [11]. Rebels will face inherent difficulties with establishing legitimacy over a population with an actively hostile majority; a neutral majority, however, can be persuaded. This is closely related to state weakness in that the neutrality of a population is often assured through their disillusionment with the state rather than sympathy for the rebels. In addition to previously discussed factors such as lack of legitimacy, such disillusionment may be provoked by state violence aimed at rebels (an example being indiscriminate bombing against Viet Cong insurgents by the US) [12]. Winning the sympathy of the population can sometimes be made easier through insurgents’ adaptation of an ideology capable of appealing to broad swaths of the population. An example might be Islamism in Afghanistan, where the anti-religious ideology of Communism failed to gain popular support. 

The third factor is an effective means of funding and support, the form of which can range from material supplies such as food, money and weapons to other forms of assistance such as sanctions and advocacy on the international stage. This is closely related to support of the population, following Mao’s dictum that “the people are like water and the army is like fish” [13]. More scholarly sources have also noted that external support is key for the insurgent [14]. Insurgents may also support themselves by exploiting natural resources (such as gold in the Sahel) [15] or engaging in organized crime (such as the Afghan Taliban’s exportation of opiates). Such activities become easier with the presence of a porous, poorly policed border area (such as Colombia’s border with Venezuela, the site of cocaine smuggling by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) [16]. International support, especially but not exclusively from a cross border area, is also key. Obtaining support from an outside superpower is one of the easiest ways for insurgents to overcome their asymmetric disadvantage regarding the state (the American supply of missiles to Afghanistan’s Mujahideen being a classic example) [17]. 

Fourthly, the insurgents must be capable of establishing some degree of legitimacy over the territories they take. This is crucial because the destruction of the state will not necessarily lead to the insurgents imposing their political demands – it may simply lead to general anarchy if the insurgents are unable to establish control. For example, during Liberia’s civil war, multiple rebel factions succeeded in ousting the regime of Samuel Doe, only to fight each other in a chaotic civil war afterwards [18]. The standard for rebel groups establishing legitimacy is not as high as the standards for states – for instance, Taliban insurgents faced competitors in their own territory such as ISIS-Khorasan – but at least some degree of control must be established. An objection to this point is that some rebels may suffer military defeat and loss of their territories yet still eventually take over the state (again Algeria comes to mind), raising the question of why establishing legitimacy over territory was ever important for ultimate victory. The answer is that establishing an effective alternative to state rule – even temporarily – is a key method of weakening the state in the eyes of the population and lessening the confidence of the state’s rulers in their own ability to stay permanently in power, thereby opening a path to eventual political change. This is especially true if a rebel movement can demonstrate that it is more effective at governing than the government itself. 

While all four of the above factors must be present for any rebellion to succeed, numerous other elements can contribute to insurgent success in this scenario. These include the presence of experienced or charismatic leaders, effective propaganda, and most notably, military victory. It is possible for rebels to take over a state despite military defeat – as previously mentioned, this occurred in Algeria. However, this scenario requires significant military and financial exhaustion on part of the state – France only gave up Algeria after expending enormous amounts of blood and treasure. A more common scenario – observed frequently in expeditionary counterinsurgency – is for rebels to fight the state to a stalemate and then wait for it to withdraw to take over the colony, sometimes due to regime change at home (Portugal’s colonial wars in Mozambique and Angola are examples of this). Outright military victory on the battlefield is more difficult to achieve due to asymmetry (this may be increasingly true of modern warfare due to advances in technology) – however, examples do exist, such as the French army’s 1954 disaster at Dien Bien Phu [19] at the hands of Viet Minh insurgents. 

A word must also be said about the differences of scenario one in counterinsurgency’s domestic and expeditionary varieties – fighting an internal insurgency (for instance, Mali’s Tuareg Rebellion) vs fighting an insurgency abroad (for example, the U.S. fighting insurgency in Iraq, or imperial European powers fighting rebellions in their colonies). The complete takeover of the state by rebels is more easily achieved in expeditionary situations. Overthrowing a domestic government is typically difficult due to the state’s superior power, often requiring a significant loss of public legitimacy or support by the state. In contrast, expelling a colonial state or foreign invader only requires the domestic government’s withdrawal. Domestic insurgencies are also more likely to require regular warfare to achieve the goal of state capture, whereas expeditionary insurgencies can simply wear down the state through irregular warfare until it withdraws (though this does not preclude the possibility of regular warfare, as seen again the example of Dien Bien Phu) [20]. 

Why might rebels fail to achieve victory in a scenario one? A lack of any of the four crucial factors may be fatal. Some states may simply be too strong to take on: the Soviet Union faced no successful armed rebellions in its history, and few occurred inside of the Russian core (as stated earlier, our framework does not include nonviolent state takeover by elite factions – ie, the peaceful secession of republics from the Soviet Union). Lack of a sympathetic or neutral population can also doom an insurgency, as Che Guevara discovered when he failed to gain the support of Bolivian peasants in 1967 [21]. The anti-Castro Escambray Rebellion in Cuba is a case study in perils of lacking funding or support; insurgents were isolated by government forces in the mountains and unable to receive outside resources [22]. Failure to establish legitimacy also a fatal obstacle; Myanmar’s anti-junta insurgency has been hampered by rebel failure to establish a unified alternative to the government [23]. Adverse but not necessarily fatal factors can involve foreign intervention against domestic insurgency (for instance, the US support of South Vietnam’s government against the Viet Cong), lack of advanced technology, and situations in which support for the rebellion is confined to a small minority group within a country, against which ethnic or racial prejudices can be mobilized (see for instance Saddam Hussein’s weaponization of Arab identity against Iraq’s rebellious Kurdish minority) [24]. 

Scenario Two: State Compromise

First, the state must be weakened both militarily and through the loss of legitimacy, but not to the same extent as it must be in scenario one. Since this scenario does not require rebel capture of the entire state, the state does not need to be weak overall; it only needs to be weak at projecting force into a particular physical geographic area. If it fails to control this area, it may be forced into conceding to rebel demands. This is commonly seen in expeditionary counterinsurgency, such as those of empires struggling to maintain control over remote colonies (the French, Dutch, British, and Portuguese all being examples). Rebel forces in expeditionary counterinsurgency may often gain an advantage through the utilization of impassable or intractable terrain unfamiliar to colonial powers [25]. Another example is the desert region of northern Mali during the 1990-1995 Tuareg separatist rebellion. The central government’s failure to control the area forced it to compromise with the rebels by integrating them into the military and bringing their leaders into government [26]. 

Likewise, this scenario requires sympathetic or neutral civilians, but unlike cases of total state defeat, they need not comprise a majority, since only one segment of the country needs to be controlled (an example being the insurgency waged in southern Sudan by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, resulting in the eventual independence of South Sudan in 2011 following a 2005 ceasefire and negotiations) [27]. Ideologically, crafting a message that appeals to the entire population of the state may not necessarily be as important for this reason. Another example is the first Iraqi-Kurdish War of 1961-1971. As the Kurds were a minority, most of Iraq’s population was not sympathetic to their cause. As the goal of the Kurds was secession, not regime change in Iraq as a whole, they did not need to overthrow Iraq’s central government, but only to maintain control of their own territory. Kurdish leaders were able to obtain a compromise by the state in the form of an autonomous region after government forces proved themselves unable to exert control over Iraq’s Kurdish regions [28]. 

The issue of funding and support is mostly the same in this scenario: any rebel group will need access to arms, food, and funding regardless of its scope. Since this scenario again does not include taking over the state and only requires rebel control over a single area, it is possible that less funding is necessary, though it is important to be cautious on this point – rebels will still need enough support to inflict substantial military losses on the state, as gaining enough leverage to impose their demands without taking it over is quite difficult. It is tempting to think that this scenario represents an easier path to rebel success; in actuality, it simply requires a more difficult balancing act. Neither scenario is necessarily preferable for the insurgent; either might be suitable depending on the situation. 

Lastly, scenario two still requires a rebel movement capable of establishing a certain degree of popular support and legitimacy. While such legitimacy does not necessarily need to include international recognition (for instance, Somaliland has achieved de facto independence without this), it is critical for rebels to be seen as a viable alternative government – for instance by collecting taxes, enforcing laws, and performing other basic functions of the state within the territory they control. The challenge of compelling an unwilling state to negotiate concessions requires that the state has an organization to negotiate with. If the state faces a plethora of disunited rebel movements with competing claims to the population’s loyalty, they may be less likely to engage in dealmaking with any individual group. While the existence of rival groups does not necessarily preclude this process, it is vital that there be a single most prominent group capable of being seen as the primary representative for rebel demands. 

As in scenario one, military victory is unnecessary in this scenario. Forcing the state to the negotiating table does not require a decisive victory on the battlefield; it merely requires convincing the state that making concessions is more efficient than continued warfare. This can often be done through wearing down a conventional army using guerilla warfare; thus, regular warfare in this scenario is even less likely to be necessary than in scenario one. Insurgents can also target the state’s population as the center of gravity in this scenario, by encouraging them to view the conflict as unjust or unwinnable and put pressure on the state to end it. 

Other auxiliary factors in success are symmetrical to both scenarios one and two. Outside or cross border support may be particularly important as a supporting factor in this scenario, since it centers on putting pressure on the state to change its course – international pressure on a state can be highly effective (for instance, sanctions against Sudan and aid to rebels from international organizations during the Darfur genocide) [29]. High levels of international support do not necessarily translate into victory, however – Myanmar’s rebels have yet to gain victory despite longstanding sanctions placed on the country’s military junta for its atrocities [30]. 

Failure, like victory, lies on a spectrum. Rebellions may descend into protracted, low intensity conflict with the state, with no clear path towards military or political victory; such was the result of FARC’s 52-year insurgency against the Colombian government [31]. Another pitfall is that because this path to victory requires securing only part of the population’s support, that part of the population can be more easily isolated and repressed by the government – for instance, the mass internment of South African Boers by the British. In the case of expeditionary counterinsurgency, rebels may face greater difficulty convincing an authoritarian state to negotiate as opposed to a democratic state, or in turning sympathy among its population into an advantage; Portugal, under the authoritarian Estado Nuovo regime, was the very last nation to give up its African colonies. Rebels may also be unable to exhaust the state and force it to the negotiating table if the state is being supported by an international ally – the failure of El Salvador’s Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front to overcome a government adamantly supported by the U.S. being a prime example [32]. 

Conclusion

Success in insurgency consists of achieving political goals, which means either replacing the state to implement said goals or convincing the state to give in to some of them; neither requires military victory. In both scenarios, rebels must take advantage of state weakness, have a population which is at least partly supportive or neutral, demonstrate a degree of legitimacy, and have effective means of funding and support. A lack of any of these key factors may quickly doom an insurgency, which perpetually faces an inherent asymmetric disadvantage compared to the state.

Citations

[1] Glenn, “Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube”, 43.

[2] Clausewitz, On War, 19.

[3] The Nat Turner Project, “Laws Passed”

[4] Clausewitz, On War, 17.

[5] Jones, Lessons from the Tribal Areas, 38-42.

[6] Schwarz & de Corral, “States Do Not Just Collapse and Fail”, 216.

[7] Dix, Hussman, & Walton, “Risks of Corruption to State Legitimacy and Fragility in Fragile Situations”, vii.

[8] Lecocq & Klute, “Tuareg Separatism in Mali”, 432-433.

[9] Onuoha et al, “Counterinsurgency operations of the Nigerian military and Boko Haram insurgency”, 406-415.

[10] Oxnevad, “Beyond a Desert Revolt”, 1051.

[11] Sloan, Modern Military Strategy: An Introduction, 79.

[12] Kocher et al, “Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War”, 216.

[13] Katzenbach &Hanrahan “The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung”, 328.

[14] Byman et al, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, 83-102.

[15] International Crisis Group, “Getting a Grip on Central Sahel’s Gold Rush”, 2-3.

[16] Boraz et al, Ungoverned Territories, 258-261.

[17] Westermann, “The Limits of Soviet Airpower”, 82.

[18] Kieh, “Irregular Warfare and Liberia’s First Civil War”, 72.

[19] Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars”, 178.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Kruijt, “Che Guevara and Guerilla Warfare”, 6.

[22] Brown, “The bandido counterrevolution in Cuba, 1959-1965”, Nuevo Mundo [Online]

[23] Lumbaca, “Sequencing Burma’s Resistance: A Three Phase Approach to Defeating the Junta”

[24] Voller, “Identity and the Ba’th Regime’s Campaign Against Kurdish Rebels in Northern Iraq”, 390-394.

[25] Walter, Colonial Violence, 23-27.

[26] Lecocq & Klute, “Tuareg Separatism in Mali”, 427.

[27] BBC, “South Sudan Becomes an Independent Nation”

[28] Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq, 18.

[29] Reno, “Complex Operations in Weak and Failing States: the Sudan Rebel Perspective”, 115-119.

[30] David I. Steinberg, “The United States and Burma: a ‘Boutique’ Issue?” 181-187.

[31] Lee, “The FARC and the Colombian Left: Time for a Political Solution?”, 28-30

[32] Rabasa et al, Money in the Bank, 44.

Bibliography

Books

Glenn, Russell W. Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007. 

Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Translated by J.J. Graham. London: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1997. 

Jones, Seth G. “Lessons from the Tribal Areas” in The Long Shadow of 9/11: America’s Response to Terrorism. Edited by Brian Michael Jenkins and John P. Godges. RAND Corporation, 2011. 

Sloan, Elinor C. Modern Military Strategy: An Introduction New York: Routledge, 2017.

Byman, Daniel et al. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001. 

Boraz, Stephen et al. Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007. 

Walter, Dierk. Colonial Violence: European Empires and the Use of Force, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 

Yildiz, Kerim. The Kurds in Iraq: the Past, Present, and Future. Pluto Press, 2007. 

Rabasa, Angel, et al. Money in the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations: RAND Counterinsurgency Study – Paper 4, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007. 

Journals, Think Tanks, and Websites 

 “Laws Passed”, The Nat Turner Project, accessed November 27, 2023 https://www.natturnerproject.org/laws-passed. 

Schwarz, Rolf and de Corral, Miguel. “States Do Not Just Fail and Collapse: Rethinking States in the Middle East”. Democracy and Security, 7, No. 33 (July-September 2011), 209-226. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48602689 

Dix, Sarah, Hussman, Karen, and Walton, Grant. “Risks of Corruption to State Legitimacy and Stability in Fragile Situations”. U4 Chr. Michelsen Institute. No. 3, May 2012. 

Lecocq, Baz, and Klute, George, “Tuareg Separatism in Mali”, International Journal, 68 No. 3 (September 2013), 424-434. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24709398 

Onuoha, Freedom C., et al. “Counterinsurgency operations of the Nigerian military and Boko Haram insurgency: expounding the viscid manacle”. Security Journal, 33, No. 3 (September 2020): 406-415, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41284-020-00234-6. 

Oxnevad, Ian. “Beyond a Desert Revolt: T.E. Lawrence’s Theory of Proxy War and State Creation”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 45 No. 12, 1050-1068. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1723283. 

Kocher, Matthew Adam, et al. “Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War”. American Journal of Political Science, 55, No. 2 (April 2011): 216. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23025046. 

Katzenbach, Edward L., Hanrahan, Gene Z. “The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung”, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 70, No. 3 (September, 1955). https://www.jstor.org/stable/2145469?sid=primo&origin=crossref. 

International Crisis Group. “Getting a Grip on Central Sahel’s Gold Rush”, International Crisis Group, 2019, 2-3. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep31267.4?seq=1. 

Westermann, Edward B. “The Limits of Soviet Airpower: The Bear Versus the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, 1979-1989”, School of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University: Maxwell Airforce Base, Alabama, 1997. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA391797.pdf. 

Kieh, George Klayt Jr. “Irregular Warfare and Liberia’s First Civil War”, Journal of International and Area Studies, 11, No. 1 (June 2004). 

Mack, Andrew. “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict” World Politics 27, No. 2 (January, 1975). https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009880. 

Kruijt, Dirk. “Che Guevara and Guerilla Warfare”, Globalizations Published Online April 24, 2022. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14747731.2022.2066055. 

Brown, Johnathan. “The bandido counterrevolution in Cuba, 1959-1965”, Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos [Online], 20, no. 6 https://doi.org/10.4000/nuevomundo.71412. 

Lumbaca, Lumpy. “Sequencing Burma’s Resistance: A Three Phase Approach to Defeating the Junta”, Small Wars Journal, accessed December 2, 2023, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/sequencing-burmas-resistance-three-phase-approach-defeating-junta. 

Voller, Yaniv. “Identity and the Ba’th Regime’s Campaign Against Kurdish Rebels in Northern Iraq”, Middle East Journal, 71, No. 3 (Summer 2017). https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/90016470.pdf. 

Reno, William. “Complex Operations in Weak and Failing States: the Sudan Rebel Perspective”, Prism, 1, No. 2 (March 2010). https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26469045.pdf. 

Steinberg, David I. “The United States and Burma: a ‘Boutique’ Issue?” International Affairs 86, No. 1 (January, 2010). https://www.jstor.org/stable/40389093?seq=7. 

Lee, Chris. “The FARC and the Colombian Left: Time for a Political Solution?”, Latin American Perspectives, 39, No. 1 (January 2012) https://www.jstor.org/stable/23238966?seq=3. 

What Russia’s 2022 “anti-propaganda” laws mean for the embattled LGBTQ community

Joshua Robinson

On 24th November 2022, a bundle of bills packaged as ‘anti-gay propaganda’ measures passed their third reading in the state Duma and were swiftly signed into law by President Vladimir Putin. This development represented a significant expansion – and hardening – of the vaguely-worded 2013 laws which have seen activists fined and imprisoned, and been linked to a sustained trebling in violent anti-LGBT crimes across the Russian Federation.

The scope is significantly farther-reaching than the infamous 2013 ‘anti-gay’ law. The caveat that limited restrictions to ‘distribution of propaganda to minors’ has been removed, effectively criminalising the expression of pro-LGBT sentiment. Public same-sex expression of any type – from lectures and concerts to hand-holding – fall under the remit of the restrictions if carried out in a space where others are present.

The consequences are personally and financially ruinous. Individuals can now be fined four times the 2013 legislation of up to 400,000 roubles (c. 5200 USD), equal to around a year’s average salary in Russia. Organisations can face a bankrupting 10 million rouble penalty (c. 132,000 USD), ten times higher than the mandate of the preceding legislation. 

Repeat offenders and those who use “media” to “propagandise non-traditional relations” face jail-time of up to five years. This is an unprecedented development in Russia’s post-communist history which echoes the imprisonment of around 60,000 gay men in the Soviet Union under Stalinist anti-sodomy articles. Not only has the severity of the laws increased, but the authorities have indicated how seriously they are prepared use them: in 2022, there were more prosecutions and convictions for ‘propaganda’ than any year since 2013.

These laws underpin an evolving and increasingly state-led approach to sexual minorities with a political motive. Off the back of these laws, other repressive policies have been brought to life, advancing through a ban on Trans gender-reassignment surgery (June 2023), reports of conversion therapy at private clinics, and the designation of the ‘international LGBT movement’ as an ‘extremist organisation’ (November 2023). 

Origins

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 pumped kerosene into parliament's determination and creativity when it came to repressive laws. Passing anti-LGBT laws with accompanying rhetoric had a well-established and successful precedent in Russia, and LGBT is viewed as a risk-free and politically salient scapegoat. As early as July 2022, Communist Party deputies had proposed curbing ‘childfree’ lifestyles and the promotion of “non-traditional sexual orientations.”

Targeting the LGBT community gels perfectly with the Kremlin’s narrative of Russia as a bastion of ‘traditional’ values, an ideological and political alternative to a decaying and decadent West. For parliamentarians seeking political clout and perhaps a career boost, formulating laws against “non-traditional sexual relations” goes down particularly well with the Presidential administration if framed within the context of Russia’s demographic crisis. The (mistaken) belief that clamping down on homosexuality will ameliorate cascading birth rates persists among many in Russia’s political class. 

However, the timing and focus of the laws – which explicitly merge ‘non-traditional relations’, homosexuality, ‘propaganda’, gender-transition and paedophilia into a usefully adaptable hydra that seeks to destroy Russia’s morality and demographic stability – are a reaction to events in Ukraine. Passionate speeches decrying the corruption of children and demographic threat of same-sex relations were televised as a distraction from Ukraine’s recapture of Kherson city last autumn. The criminalisation of the ‘international LGBT movement’ comes at a time of stagnation across the front and, and many polls show a dip in active support for the ‘Special Military Operation’.

LGBT, therefore, makes an excellent scapegoat. The Kremlin can score almost guaranteed approval rating victories by tapping into the homophobic climate in society that it has helped to cultivate. A 2020 Levada poll revealed that 18% of Russia’s population said that they wanted LGBT people ‘eliminated’, down from 21% in 2015.

Impacts

‘Non-traditional relations’, in conjunction with November’s ban on the ‘international LGBT movement’, continues a trend of vague language used in Russia’s discriminatory legislation. This absence of clear definitions is a strategic device that allows Russia's authorities to apply the laws as they see fit and fosters a culture of fear among Russia’s queer citizens. Even before the law was signed, publishers scrambled to censor literature that referenced same-sex relationships. One video posted on the RUSSIA NEXT Telegram news channel shows a new copy of Max Falk’s ‘Shattered’ with references to same-sex relationships blocked out. Several publishers, such as Popcorn books, are now under investigation by the authorities for ‘propagandising’ same-sex relationships. The ‘cancel culture’ that propaganda professionals like Olga Skabayeva adore to admonish in bombastic talk shows has become most overt in post-war Russia itself. 

Telegram remains a haven for queer activist, social and dating groups, as do a variety of international gay dating apps, though Russia has taken steps to makes these less accessible.  Queer activist spaces such as St. Petersburg’s Действия still run their lectures underground, and some of those most public of queer spaces, gay bars, remain open – though, as I noted on a trip in February, the already slimmest of rainbow flags has been replaced with neutral branding.

It is still possible to have a life as an LGBT person in Russia, but that life is increasingly difficult. The rise in prosecutions for propaganda shows that the authorities are ready to pursue people for a crime that are not fully defined. The hounding of activists and police raids on queer clubs in Moscow and St. Petersburg – some of which have since been shuttered – reinforces the legislative message that ‘you are not welcome here.’ To live as a gay, lesbian, bisexual, trans, or queer person in the Russian Federation today means increasingly suppressing your identity and maintaining an increasingly high degree of self-censorship in public spaces, whether that be speech and dress, to public expression of affection. LGBT people will still form networks and social groups, but these will shift increasingly from private to secretive spaces as public – including digital – spaces are increasingly surveilled. 

It is not the anti-propaganda laws on their own that are suppressing the lives of Russia’s queer citizens in such a devastating way. Rather, a new state approach to sexual minorities and the instrumentalisation of a cumulative buildup of discriminatory legislation, annihilation of trans rights, designation of a host of LGBTQ charities and support organisations as ‘Foreign Agents’, increasingly vehement rhetoric in and out of parliament, and a tolerance for anti-LGBT violence by those in positions of power is shaping Russia in a way that is putting the lives of queer citizens at risk. Those that have the means to leave have done so or are in the process: but most LGBTQ citizens do not have this option. The West has been reluctant to accept Russian applications for asylum in the wake of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, though this has shown tentative signs of changing in recent weeks in the wake of new laws against sexual minorities in the country.

If stagnation in the war continues, or should things take a turn for the worse for Russia’s armed forces, LGBT people may become scapegoated in more sinister ways. The Russian state has already indicated its willingness to use legislation to boost approval-ratings in the face of political difficulties. What is changing, however, is the implementation of legislation beyond exemplary cases and bombastic parliamentary speeches. Political homophobia is being translated into serious action not only against prominent activists and protesters, but non-activist LGBT citizens – including under-18s – and commercial establishments. The political homophobia of an increasingly militarised and war-ready Russia may well grow into something more centralised and systematic, should the Kremlin’s ‘Special Military Operation’ fail to secure victories it cannot sell at home. 

Artificial Intelligence is this Generation’s Jurassic Park

Janani Mohan

The day before November 30, 2022, was a normal day—artificial intelligence was a growing problem that many knew nothing about and most ignored. Then, OpenAI dropped an early version of ChatGPT. Within five days, the AI-based bot garnered one million users. With ChatGPT pioneering the way to the “AI revolution,” AI became better, faster, and more accessible than ever before. While GPT-1 was a barebones model that demonstrated what AI could be, subsequent versions leading up to the current GPT-4 served up that potential with improved models, increased data points, and higher-skilled, human-like capabilities. But in the midst of this, one question is just starting to get asked—is this revolution good for humanity, or could it be this generation's “Jurassic Park”?

Soon after the release of ChatGPT in the mainstream, organizations became the first to regulate it. Companies prevented staff from using AI in their work due to security risks and inaccuracies, and universities established that using AI on exams was cheating. These responses all prevented the use of AI in specific circumstances but did not consider more broadly if and where AI development should be constrained. In the United States, it became a question for the government to deliberate. Over the past year, the U.S. Congress has held multiple hearings on AI, but these hearings proved challenging due to the government-technology gap. Congressmembers often struggle to meaningfully discuss the dangers posed by AI, because they still need to learn more about what AI is to understand what it can do.

This government-technology gap serves as a prime example of the fundamental paradox of AI governance: tech companies can but won’t; governments can’t but need to. Tech companies are developing new AI products and expecting the government to regulate them; governments do not understand AI enough at this point to set such policies. Tech companies are fast-paced and turn around updates every few months; governments are slow and need more time to formulate and authorize policy. AI is a major opportunity for many tech companies; governments treat AI as one of numerous emerging issues that they need to respond to. The problem with this paradox is that tech companies are the only ones currently capable of thinking through whether certain upgrades to AI are beneficial to humanity but are often too lost in their excitement of what can be done to think about what should be. 

Considering how best to govern AI must therefore be treated as a serious and compounding issue. Recent AI development includes attempts to create stronger capabilities and greater sentience, and these two factors coupled together could prove dire. The framework for understanding AI sentience includes four levels: reactive machines where AI responds, limited memory where AI learns from limited feedback, theory of mind where AI understands human emotions, and self-awareness where AI can have its own emotions in response. While only the first two currently exist, as AI progresses and gains more autonomy, it could gain theory of mind and self-awareness, or at least processes that mimic these two. This is a problem considering that AI could have a theory of mind that “rationally” determines the best course of action, but whose system of rationality is based on faulty ethics that lead it to cause harm.      

Beyond this futuristic, yet fast-approaching issue, even in its current state, AI can cause problems when used incorrectly or without proper oversight by humans. Because AI learns from limited feedback, AI can currently recognize patterns and provide recommendations that treat these patterns as causal, ignoring broader nuances. And, even when AI does its job correctly, AI is only as good as the data that is inputted into its algorithms, which means that faulty datasets can lead to faulty conclusions. For example, the use of AI in predictive algorithms for crime has led to racial bias issues in decision-making by police forces and legal systems, due to poor datasets and treating demographics incorrectly as a causal factor. 

Although the potential for where AI can go next is still uncertain and many decry sounding alarm bells too early, a helpful reminder is that many thought what ChatGPT could do was just a future possibility, or even the plot of a futuristic sci-fi movie, before November 2022. And yet, that future is here: AI is proving to be this generation’s Jurassic Park, where tech companies advance AI without fully considering its potential downsides. AI that follows human controls is AI that can be regulated. But, if AI stops responding to human controls, much like sentient dinosaurs, or utilizes poor datasets and logic, it could be a problem that is no longer solvable. To put it simply, the future of artificial intelligence could shape the future of our planet. And, governance must respond to AI immediately, like it's a bunch of man-eating dinosaurs that could forever change the world—before it does.

A Decade of Peace Processes in Colombia

Dr Andrei Gómez-Suárez | Univeristy of Winchester

Alejandro Posada-Téllez | University of Oxford

On November 1, 2023, former Colombian President and Nobel Peace Laureate, Juan Manuel Santos, HE Roy Barreras, Ambassador of Colombia to the United Kingdom, Danilo Rueda, Colombia's High Commissioner for Peace, and Dr. Gwen Burnyeat, Junior Research Fellow at Merton College, Oxford, took part in a dialogue hosted at St John's College, Oxford. This event, jointly organised by Anglo-Colombian peacebuilding organisation Rodeemos el Diálogo (ReD, Embrace Dialogue), the University of Winchester's Centre of Religion, Reconciliation and Peace, and the Oxford Network of Peace Studies (OxPeace), provided a space for a first-hand discussion on Colombia's strenuous journey towards lasting peace. 

This dialogue across the Petro and Santos administrations represents a momentous step in knowledge exchange, reflecting a decade’s worth of lessons learned in peace processes. They show continuities and discontinuities between the administrations and invite reflection on the significant interconnections between past and present initiatives for peace. The insights have the potential to inspire and inform improved practices in Colombia's ongoing pursuit of peace and to offer valuable pointers for governments and peacebuilders in conflict-affected regions worldwide.

A Decade of Peacebuilding in Colombia

Colombia has grappled with half a century of protracted armed conflict. The 2016 Peace Agreement, negotiated between President Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), marked a pivotal moment in the nation's quest for peace. The agreement was the result of six years of negotiations, which formally started in 2012. 

The agreement includes an agrarian reform; provisions to strengthen political participation; a comprehensive solution to illicit drugs; the satisfaction of victims’ rights and full respect of international human rights; the end of the conflict with the FARC; security guarantees for former combatants and activists; and cross-cutting gender and ethnic dispositions.

Their implementation of the agreement did not start in full swing due to political opposition. However, it made substantial progress with the disarmament of the FARC, the group’s transition into a political party, and the creation of a comprehensive transitional justice system – including a Transitional Justice Tribunal known as the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), until 2018, when Iván Duque, a staunch critic of the peace agreement, was elected president. Then followed a serious decline in the pace of implementation and open opposition from the government to the autonomous institutions created by the peace agreement, such as the JEP. The frustration of a large sector of society with the lack of implementation contributed to the election in 2022 of Gustavo Petro, the first-ever leftist president of Colombia.

Since taking power in August 2022, the Petro administration has put forward an ambitious peace policy, known as ‘Total Peace’, to bring all forms of organised violence in Colombia to an end. As some panelists discussed in this event, at the heart of Petro’s peace agenda is the 2016 Peace Agreement, which has prompted the government to pay special attention to three elements of the agreement. First, to deliver on the agrarian reform by giving land back to peasant farmers, ethnic groups, and conflict victims, while pushing Congress to create an Agrarian Jurisdiction with the constitutional ability to resolve land disputes. Second, to guarantee the security of former FARC combatants and community leaders by reactivating the National Commission of Security Guarantees. Third, to fulfill victims’ rights by committing to support full implementation of the recommendations included in the final report of the Truth Commission and backing up the investigations of the JEP. 

An additional key pillar of “Total Peace” is the quest to dismantle all remaining illegal armed groups, which was an important commitment of the 2016 Peace Agreement. To this end, the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace under the Petro administration resumed negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN), taking the progress made under the Santos administration as a starting point, and created a legal framework to explore political and socio-juridical negotiations with other illegal armed groups. So far, there are ongoing dialogues with the Estado Mayor Central (EMC), a dissident group of the FARC, and three urban dialogues in the cities of Buenaventura, Quibdó, and Medellín. According to the Petro administration, any agreements reached during these will build upon the 2016 Peace Agreement and will abide by the standards of international law.

Lessons for Solid and Comprehensive Peace Agreements

Three main lessons emerged from the event for strengthening peace negotiations:

1. The idea of ‘carrots and sticks’ highlights the intricate nature of peace negotiations. In peace talks, negotiators often extend incentives, or 'carrots', to encourage armed groups to lay down their weapons. Simultaneously, there is a need for credible deterrence, or 'sticks', to ensure compliance with the terms of the agreement. Striking a harmonious balance between these elements is paramount to the success of peace negotiations. 

2. Truth-seeking and victim-centred provisions within peace processes are fundamental. Recognising the suffering of victims and acknowledging the deep wounds inflicted by the conflict on individuals and communities are pivotal components for sustainable reconciliation and peace. Comprehensive attention to these issues is central to processes of healing and restoration of the social fabric in post-conflict societies and must be integrated into negotiation processes from the very beginning.

3. Flexibility is a key aspect of peace negotiations, allowing for adaptation to ever-evolving conflict dynamics. In a constantly changing socio-political landscape, an adaptive pace-making methodology proves as vital as the substance of the agreements themselves. This adaptability ensures that new realities on the ground can be effectively addressed.

Lessons for Ensuring Implementation of Peace Agreements 

The dialogue suggested that four factors that can contribute to the implementation of peace agreements:

1. Peace agreements must be integrated into a nation's legal framework. This legal binding elevates peace from a mere political promise to a binding commitment of the state enforceable under the law. 

2. International support is vital, including that of the United Nations Security Council, to nurture trust between the parties and hold them accountable for the implementation of agreements. Respectful international involvement introduces layers of security and commitment, reinforcing the stability of the peace process.

3. The legitimacy and political will of a government pave the way for more effective implementation of agreements. This highlights the deeply political nature of peacebuilding processes and the need to overcome the dogma of liberalism that conceives of transitions from war to peace as technical and apolitical. 

4. With information overloads producing fertile ground for disinformation, the creation of pedagogy teams to effectively communicate the progress of negotiations and the implementation of peace agreements to national and international audiences is critical. This can help address concerns such as the lack of trust in governments, and political polarisation. This may in turn enhance the support of civil society for the long-term process of building peace.

Lessons for the Future of Peacebuilding in Colombia and Beyond

The past decade of peace processes in Colombia should be seen as a continuous, multi-generational effort that transcends political administrations. To consolidate the commitment of the state, there must be an ongoing, open dialogue among all stakeholders, ensuring that the lessons learned from previous processes are carried forward and inform the strategies of future administrations. This will help build trust, understanding, and foster a sense of national unity – albeit agonistic – on the path to peace.

These lessons have far-reaching implications, serving as indicators for those striving to construct and uphold peace in Colombia and beyond. Colombia's journey towards sustainable peace exemplifies the need for comprehensive, adaptable, and inclusive strategies to address the multifaceted challenges of societies transitioning from war to peace.

U.S.-India Strategic Cooperation: A Path to Permanent Partnership

John connor

The unipolar moment is at its end. China’s rise, the resurgence of American isolationism, and India and Brazil’s economic and demographic growth all point towards the return of multipolarity in international politics. In a world no longer defined by traditional paradigms or unipolar U.S. hegemony, great powers must cultivate partnerships based not merely on Cold War era affiliations but also upon mutual economic and military self-interest.  

The U.S. and India both can and should pursue cooperation based on mutual interests. By no means should the U.S. expect to form an alliance akin to current U.S. partnerships with South Korea, Japan, or Australia. These alliance-making models risk involving New Delhi in international confrontations where its national interest is not at stake. But there are extensive overlapping interests that make a strategic partnership viable. This can be accomplished by reinforcing existing military cooperation in the Indian Ocean and the Himalayas, while also streamlining forums for trade talks and fully implementing the 2008 U.S.-India Civil-Nuclear Agreement. Through this combined civil, military, and economic approach, both countries can set a firm groundwork for future cooperation.  

To counter China’s growing influence in South Asia, the U.S. can build upon its policy of reinforcing India’s military. Currently, the U.S. and Indian militaries work together via annual military exercises such as Yudh Abhyas (land forces) and Cope India (air force).  Additionally, the Malabar naval exercises have  expanded to include the Japanese and Australian navies. Both nations also cooperate to monitor international shipping and Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean.

At sea, better defensive postures against China can be achieved through U.S. assistance in upgrading India’s bases in the Andaman and Nicobar islands. By aiding Australia with its bases on its northern coast and the Keeling Islands, the U.S. can eventually hope to create a tri-national naval bulwark against Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific, leaving allied naval forces within striking distance of Chinese forces in the South China Sea (protecting American interests in Taiwan). This provides the U.S. with an effective deterrent to a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan without having to further escalate tensions by supplying Taiwan directly. It could simultaneously deter worrisome Chinese activity in Sri Lanka’s Hambantota harbor, which was built with Chinese funds and sometimes hosts Chinese warships. The U.S. can also supply India with air-launched anti-ship missiles and undersea drones to surveille Chinese naval activity. Cooperation and eventual rotational deployments between Indian, U.S., and Australian bases can reinforce this framework, strengthen existing alliances such as AUKUS, and build on existing ties such as the Quad. In the long term, this naval alliance can enhance trust between the U.S. and India, transforming bilateral relations from a mostly transactional relationship to a more enduring alliance.  

On land, the Himalayas also present fertile grounds for military cooperation. As China grows more aggressive in its border dispute with India’s Ladakh region, America can supply India with surveillance equipment and cold weather gear to deter the encroachments of Chinese patrols.  The U.S. should also continue counterintelligence sharing with Indian forces. The Obama administration’s Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) aimed to achieve some of these goals by building up India’s military tech sector, although these efforts were hampered by the reluctance of U.S. defense firms to part with their intellectual property and invest in India’s relatively small defense market. However, the Biden administration’s Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) successfully bypasses this issue by focusing on technologies not limited to defense, such as AI, semiconductors, high performance computing, and quantum technologies. While the DTTI was explicitly focused on defense, iCET is much broader and industry focused. In the education sector, initiatives such as STEM talent exchanges and partnerships between U.S. and Indian universities have emerged. Other pillars include a bilateral space partnership and plans to aid the Indian government in assessing the semiconductor industry and its role in global supply chains. 

It would be a mistake, however, to narrow the scope of U.S.-Indian partnership to their mutual interest vis-a-vis China. America and India can also work together on a variety of issues ranging from trade (particularly pharmaceuticals, for which the U.S. depends heavily on India), to nuclear power, as well as diplomacy in Africa and the Pacific.  

Trade is perhaps most vital. Historically, U.S. trade relations with India have been hampered by India’s skepticism of plurilateral trade agreements; India opted out of the trade portion of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (the successor to the Trans-Pacific Partnership) and remains opposed to e-commerce negotiations at the WTO due to opposition to the WTO’s moratorium on duties for electronic transmissions. Currently, U.S.-India trade talks are being conducted through the Strategic Trade Dialogue (part of the aforementioned iCET), which primarily covers iCET related issues. Ordinary issues such as tariff reductions and economic policy unrelated to foreign affairs are discussed through the Trade Policy Forum. However, Trade Policy Forum talks have experienced limited success in part due to tariffs imposed by both sides during the Trump administration.  

By ending this bifurcated division and seeking to improve trade ties in areas such as agriculture and pharmaceuticals (rather than only through iCET and defense-related industries), the U.S. can strengthen its relationship with India.  India’s reluctance to engage in plurilateral agreements could be resolved by a separate, bilateral free trade treaty, like Australia’s      Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA) with India in 2022. The EU has begun talks for a similar agreement, which could also provide a blueprint for the United States. Despite India’s historic reticence, limited participation in plurilateral negotiations is also possible. India could increase its foreign investment by joining the WTO’s negotiations on Investment Facilitation for Development, aimed at improving the environment for investment in developing nations.  

Fully implementing the 2008 U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement represents another diplomatic step.  Despite Congressional approval of the Agreement in 2008 and an additional agreement to build 6 U.S. designed nuclear reactors in India in 2016, no reactors have been delivered. The deal has already allowed India to expand its share of clean energy and sign uranium import agreements with a variety of countries, becoming the only nation outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty to obtain fuel for its reactors.  

Completion of the deal can be aided by policy reforms in both countries. India must amend its Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA), which departs from standards established in the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. While the Convention requires that plant operators (rather than suppliers) assume responsibility for potential damages, the CLNDA still allows suppliers to face liability, resulting in many western companies expressing hesitation to supply India’s reactors (and causing India to rely instead on the Russian state company Rosatom). Likewise, the U.S. can speed up the deal’s implementation by allowing export licenses for technology used in India’s nuclear program, such as nanotechnology, commercial space launch components, and X-ray equipment.  

Closer U.S.-India cooperation can also provide the U.S. with a diplomatic advantage throughout the global south. While many nations in these regions may not entirely trust the U.S., India commands a large share of goodwill. Earlier this year, Papua New Guinea’s prime minister James Marape extended a warm welcome to Narendra Modi, declaring the need for a “third big voice” on the world stage and pledging that the Pacific “will rally behind your leadership”. As Russia extends its influence in the global south by backing anti-western regimes in Africa, and China continues to expand its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), India’s friendship will become vital for the U.S. to maintain its relationships among these nations.  

A potential stumbling block in the U.S.-India relationship is America’s complex relationship with Pakistan, a longtime ally in the Cold War and more recently during the Afghanistan conflict. Ongoing tensions in Kashmir could disrupt American efforts to maintain good ties with both its South Asian allies. However, the expansion of BRI into Pakistan calls into question the nation’s geostrategic allegiance to the U.S. India presents the U.S. with a more stable regional partnership, and one without the baggage of the Pakistani military’s complicated role in the Afghan war (which often involved funding jihadists even while receiving support from the U.S. to fight them).                           

Increased strategic cooperation presents mutual military, diplomatic, and economic advantages to India and the U.S. As an aspiring great power, India will never have and does not desire the type of alliance that exists between the U.S. and treaty allies such as Japan or NATO countries.  But to continue its climb towards becoming a great power, India requires American assistance, which is in the U.S. interest to provide. While American concerns regarding China may not be entirely the same as Indian concerns, the two overlap considerably. Through a simultaneous pursuit of a greater military and economic partnership, the U.S. and India can each achieve their strategic goals.  

double standards in International Law - Ukraine compared with Cyprus

Michael stavrinos | professor of international law, university of nicosia

International law is the set of rules, norms, principles, and standards generally recognized as binding between states. It establishes normative guidelines and a common conceptual legal and ethical framework for states across a broad range of domains, including war, diplomacy, and human rights. At its core, International Law aims to promote the practice of stable, consistent, and organised international relations.

Following Hugo Grotius’ visionary conceptualisation of inter-state obligatory regulation, the contemporary international community strives toward the mandatory enforcement of the rules, prescribing state interactions in an orderly manner. If International Law were not respected, international anarchy would prevail, resembling the international community’s order in the state of nature, where the right to rule inheres to strength alone.

International Law and the Situation in Ukraine

The ongoing events in Ukraine, including the consequential human and material losses, reflect the inability of the current international judicial system to fulfil its purpose. The same applies to the ongoing human tragedy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The international community must respond to this weakness by demanding an accurate diagnosis of the problem and corrective proposals in response, aiming to strengthen International Law as a preventative system against emerging global catastrophes.

One may argue that it is the stance of the International Community itself which has permitted and promoted unacceptable inter-state behaviour. The strongest states have the power to impose their will on the weakest. However, International Law limits inter-state behaviour, prohibiting the use of force, invasions, and occupations of a third country’s territory, limiting thus, the abuse of power in international relations.

International Organizations, primarily the UN, bear the paramount responsibility to preserve peace and regulate the conduct of war. Unfortunately, the political nature of its decision making, instantiated most directly by the veto afforded to the Permanent Members of its Security Council, often prohibits the enforcement of International Law. Only a uniform and objective condemnation of every violation of International Law could have prevented today’s dramatic events in Ukraine and similar conflicts.

Ukraine compared with Cyprus

The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, and the subsequent occupation of one-third of the nation's territory, continuing to this day, parallels the current events in Ukraine. Türkiye had, through its official undertaking in the form of an internationally binding Treaty, the obligation to guarantee and defend the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. Türkiye’s pretext to “intervene” was to restore legal order, (as officially stated by Türkiye in front of the UN General Assembly in 1974). However, the catalytic question which Turkey and the international community have failed to respond to is: Why is Türkiye still occupying, after 50 years, with 40,000 soldiers and the presence of NATO weapons, one-third of Cyprus, when legal order was reestablished only seven days after the military coup against the elected President? According to the Cypriot Constitution, the replacement of the Republican President with the Parliamentary President, constitutional order was reinstated. 

Due to political considerations, the US, UK, Soviet Union, and NATO, consented to Türkiye’s invasion and subsequent violations of International Law. The UN, instead of clearly condemning an invasion and occupation of one of its sovereign member states by another, opted for mild language, due again to the relevant stance of the aforementioned Permanent Members. It is worth underlining at this point, that the UK too was a guarantor of Cypriot independence and has forsaken its international obligations. Germany also bears substantial responsibility, with German-made tanks playing a crucial role in executing the invasion and maintaining the occupation of Cyprus’ territory. 

Cyprus, despite being a victim of invasion and occupation, has faced an arms embargo itself, due to its “de facto” position in a ‘war situation’ - a stark contrast to Türkiye - which only faced a temporary arms embargo imposed by the American Congress. When one considers this historical context, the contradictory nature of States’ behaviour, such as that of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany, becomes evident. One questions how the newly elected German Chancellor could reconcile his adamant stance against the occupation of Ukraine - contributing to the urgent and unprecedented strengthening of the Germany military - when his first official visit abroad involved cordial exchanges with Türkiye (Hurriet Daily News, March 9, 2022.) 

Today, Türkiye is the only state which consistently employs threats of force in its official inter-state relations with Greece, in violation of the mandatory provisions of the UN Charter, without the international community, and in disregard of condemnations by the UN itself! If one considers the behaviour of various states concerning the case of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, it is natural to wonder why the very same actors react with such an outcry against the occupation of Ukraine. Perhaps the biggest paradox is Türkiye’s condemnation of the Russian invasion while pretending that she can play a reconciliatory role in Eastern Europe when she is liable for the very same international crime.

The recipe for avoiding illegal use of force  

The International Community needs urgently new and strict rules of behaviour: 

• The UN must abolish the veto in cases where a Permanent Member of its Security Council is adjudicated to be directly or indirectly involved in a crime of aggression.

• Every case of foreign invasion and occupation ought to be condemned and overturned, retrospectively. 

• The UN’s relevant Resolutions must be enforced by strict sanctions and, subsequently, by the implementation of Chapter 7 of the Charter, (that is the use of military and nonmilitary action by the Security Council, to restore international peace and security), in cases where the aggressor continues disregarding the International Community’s verdict, within a short period.

Today’s dramatic events exhibit the international order’s inability to cope with the Crime of Aggression effectively. If the necessary adaptations are not implemented, before too long, a Third World War could reach our doors. The International Community bears critical responsibility for taking the right measures to avoid global disaster. We must act now.

LGBTQ Families and Family Values Ideology in the United States

Priscilla Otero Guerra 

Family is central to political socialisation. The politicisation of the American family in the United States is a bipartisan strategy and a powerful influence on social development. Politicians have a proclivity to discuss family, inasmuch that the publication of family images for public imagery as political strategy is not a novel occurrence. As political scientists Laurel Elder and Steven Greene articulated in The Politics of Parenthood (2013), without standard regard to LGBTQ families, “parenthood represents a significant and underexplored agent of adult political socialisation.” LGBTQ families of the United States must be included in the national public U.S. imagery to support liberal democratic norms given that parenthood is vital to political socialisation.

Politicians and Family Values as Ideology 

Perspectives influenced by beliefs are powerful agents that structure public imagery. To be specific, beliefs are ideas emerging from socialisation and have been proven to contribute to political polarisation, social-economic inequalities, and violence. Politicians use images capturing action to portray themselves in alliance with political party ideology. Public members of the Republican Party in the United States systematically release photographs to the public of their heteronormative nuclear families, many of whom have young children, to reinforce commitment to collective political ideas of family values as ideology.

Family values are a politicised ideology consisting of beliefs in support of criminalising abortion, support for neoconservatism, support of expansive yet rigid traditional gender roles in American society, against divorce, against homosexuality, and against redefining marriage as a union between men and women. Values of family, ideas held as beliefs to what family should do, which may consist of socio-political ideologies, are not congruent to family values ideology. Southern states have traditionally, in culture and economics, associated family values ideology with the Protestant church. The family values system perpetually encourages nuclear families when compared to the average family in the United States, an abundance of children while in a heterosexual marriage, and somehow, in the same vein, gun ownership as a signifier of success.

In 2021 United States Representative Lauren Boebert of Colorado innocuously aroused public controversy in the United States when a photograph of her smiling family, consisting of her young children bearing guns in front of a Christmas tree, was published for the public. The caption to the photograph on a popular social media platform read, “The Boeberts have your six, @RepThomasMassie!" Representative Lauren Boebert’s photograph was in response to United States Representative Thomas Massie of Kentucky and his earlier photographic release of his rather large patriarchal family, wielding rather large guns, with the caption “Merry Christmas! ps. Santa, please bring ammo” days after a mass shooting in Michigan. 

Images can arouse support or negation for a socio-political cause. Representative Lauren Boebert and Representative Thomas Massie's campaign for the U.S. constitutional right to bear arms in the Second Amendment, with rigid beliefs against revisions of the amendment, is expected given that gun ownership is a component of family values ideology. For those unfamiliar with the American concept of family values, photographs of gun-clutching nuclear families might be perceived as abrasive, if not, inciteful. For those in the United States, however, guns are perceived as symbols of resistance to tyranny, for the protection of self and family. Gun ownership as a family affair in the United States is a social reality and a reflection of not simply national identity, but personal identity. Geography and political party membership influence perceptions of gun ownership. In contrast to urban areas, rural areas are more supportive of Second Amendment rights without revisions. Democrats are more supportive of gun restrictions. Likewise, while the LGBTQ population has had no set political party affiliation, political membership for LGBTQ families in the United States has been more successful with the Democratic Party due to national migration patterns to northern urban areas. Democratic state legislation pertaining to the progressive civil and economic rights of homosexual citizens has been traditionally socially liberal. In contrast to the Democratic Party, Republicans frequently share family imagery with the public in support of a nationalised perspective of family which provokes and amplifies conversations on family identity. 

A simple search of images released to the public of Republican Party members reveals the use of heteronormative families with children to advocate for public policies and the GOP political platform. The differences between political parties have resulted in differing domestic regional imagery of LGBTQ families by location over time. Family values imagery is often supported by direct action such as the Texas Republican Party Platform. In support of constitutional regionalism, the Texas Republican Party Platform explicitly reaffirms marriage between one biological male and one biological female to respond to recent LGBTQ equality national laws and increasing media inclusion of LGBTQ individuals. Actions portrayed in images for society’s consumption have the potential to evolve the habitus and representation of LGBTQ families in the public imagery of the United States or devolve them. Family values ideology is incorporated as a belief system with a subset of ideas or issues that are then applied to society.

The Body as a Transmitter of Messages

In 2022 Republican Florida Governor Ron DeSantis staged a photograph of himself surrounded by onlooking school children in support of a campaign against LGBTQ parental rights in state-supported schools. The photograph was officially released within the context of fighting for the collective future of American children, vilifying opposition, as Governor Desantis signed the controversial “Parental Rights in Education” bill into law. The law effectively censors LGBTQ families by prohibiting discussion of sexual and gender identity in classrooms from kindergarten to grade three. It is a discernible assumption that LGBTQ families consist of young children. Categorising LGBTQ families as a topic of discussion that is not age-appropriate presently disregards the parental figures of young children in the state of Florida. The photographic image of private school uniformed white children in the presence of a bill’s passing those limits freedoms to state-funded school children, when the socioeconomic status of LGBTQ families and most of the citizens of the United States limit private school enrolment, signals classist elitism. 

Ron DeSantis is an embodiment of perceptions of white American upper-class culture, an identity he performs for national media headlines to pillar family values ideology. His re-election campaign for Governor of Florida in 2022 never announced to the public with words that Republican Governor Ron DeSantis was the quintessential successful heteronormative family man protecting the country’s children’s future, except in the 2022 campaign advertisement slogan “God made a Fighter”, but images and political actions alluded to a conservative and traditional elitist version of the American dream to a global audience. At the time, former Deputy Prime Minister of Australia John Anderson AC advised that Governor Ron DeSantis as president of the United States would result in a “coherent global leader.” As a Republican, Ron Desantis utilises family values ideology as armour in defence of southern rural values. Now that Ron DeSantis is on the campaign in 2023 for the Republican presidential nomination, his wife Casey DeSantis launched a national campaign ‘Mamas for Desantis’ advocating for parental rights within the paradigm of the ideology of family values.

Philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty understood the body to be a transmitter of messages perceiving surrounding objects. Our bodies are in the act of performance responsive to social structures constructed by history. As philosopher Linda Martin Alcoff put forth in Visible Identities (2005), social identities are relational, contextual, and fundamental to self and the visibility of identities is “vital to allocate roles and to structure interactions.” Political actions are images that allude to a perception of societal power centred on designated roles. Images in society, in their various constructions, represent society or perceptions of collective wants. By induction, images convey a powerful social understanding of acceptability to the onlooker. World Advertising Research Center published a study by Northey et al in 2020 on LGBTQ representation in advertisements in the United States and found that “individuals' political ideology determines their emotional response to such advertisements.” If advertisements can elicit emotional responses, political images can inhibit them. When political images elicit variable emotional responses, they can become tools for diversity and inclusion. As of 2022, LGBTQ marriage equality is national law in the United States and a foreign policy objective of the Biden Administration. Media representation of LGBTQ individuals in the entertainment industry is rising. Thus, a vital question must be asked: What is the future for LGBTQ families in the state of Florida and of other similar states where family values ideology reign? 

The Importance of Political Imagery 

Positive political images have the power to represent and hence reinforce the diversity found in families across the United States. However, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) released a statistical study of political violence that found “acts of political violence targeting the LGBT+ community have more than tripled compared to 2021” in the United States including “attacks by spontaneous, violent mobs; law enforcement; and/or extremist individuals or groups.” The tragic 2022 shooting in Colorado of Club Q, an LGBTQ nightclub, by the grandson of a Republican Party representative, is an alarm toward the extremism encountered in the United States. Radical actions, including an increasing amount of online hate constructed of anti-LGBTQ political images, have increased in response to the Biden-Harris Administration’s inclusionary domestic and foreign policies on LGBTQ equality. Representing members of the LGBTQ community with positive political images will reduce similar acts of violence and support liberal democratic norms of inclusivity.

Philosopher Charles Taylor stresses the importance of recognizing identities to fulfill universal human potential. Recognition is human dignity. Human dignity consists of power; that is power expressed in the importance of actions in ordinary life. Human dignity is in self-sufficiency and in receiving positivity from others, humans, as Taylor wrote in Sources of the Self (1989), “find the sense of life through articulating it.” Positive political images have the power to reinforce the diversity found in families across the United States and give power by representation to individuals harmed by political violence. A 2019 study by the Family Equality Council obtained evidence that around 3.7 million children under the age of 18 had an LGBTQ parent. The United States census reported in 2020 that 15% of 1.1 million same-sex couples in the United States had children, with numbers rising, compared to around 40% of opposite-sex couples. The importance of inclusion in the nation's public image supports liberal democratic norms and can reduce hierarchical social violence. Omission and misrepresentation in society reduce the sense of life while family values ideology categorises homosexual families as less in value when compared to heterosexual families, if not categorically immoral, and a vicious threat against a patriarchal nature of heteronormativity that needs protecting. International representation of American LGBTQ families in diplomacy can ignite a conversation for support of global liberal democracies and prevent international support of such beliefs against LGBTQ families. Diplomatic actions, such as allowing U.S. embassies to fly the LGBTQ flag, would be buttressed and enhanced by U.S. national imagery that includes LGBTQ families.

The reference to family values ideology and the use of images particularly associated with the Republican Party is not to state that political officials of the Democratic Party do not release photographic images to the public of their families. The politicisation of families with images has legacies in both political parties. Compared to political officials of the Republican Party, the purpose of the family images of Democrats is typically not to instill perceptions of family values into the public imagery as a system of beliefs component of an ideology or even as a response to family values ideology. As can be observed, gun ownership is not a common Democratic family value in the normative sense nor is the belief of representative protection against a tyrannical national government. Democrats most frequently emphasise family diversity, more so family differences in policies. Former Democratic President Barack Obama, both in campaigns and in office, often utilised photographs and speeches evoking imagery against the absent father stereotype typical of perceptions of African American families at the time. Images were met with collective praise from the African American community and represented social progress. 

The Future for LGBTQ Families in the U.S. National Imagery

On the national front, members in power of the two leading national parties meagerly mention LGBTQ families’ rights, whether by representation in photographic images for the national public image or in public policy measures. Further questions emerge from Republicans placing family as a sense of power, with political images of families and children while Democrats do not: Will recent historic levels of LGBTQ representatives in Congress innovate the public image of family in the United States? What could be the global political implications? What of political party members in the United States erasing LGBTQ families from their constituency and the national public imagery?  

Societal definitions of family have traditionally omitted families when there are no visually identified heterosexual norms in the socially defined unit. The imagery of stability that families convey, with the projection of likeness to persisting social expectations elicited, are powerful political tools. Campaign speeches utilise the topic of families frequently to garner electoral support, and photographic images are included in these efforts. Families are an important measure of societal stability and policies passed by Congress influence families, the potential to create them, and the natural human need to belong in society. Regardless, the politicisation of family and the imagery elicited, in both the Democratic Party and the GOP, disproportionally continues to remain white-cultured, classist, and heteronormative. The national homosexual imagery continues to portray LGBTQ individuals as a sexualised exotic, an individualist antagonist, with imagery of omitting families with children as an important societal measure worth valuing. Beliefs on hierarchy, perceptions of who has value in society, are then inherently accepted by electoral voters as collective social norms for leadership positions or exclusions in American society. Therefore, political images influence multiple powerful sectors of society, including business, education, and the entertainment-media industries compounding the national imagery of who has value in American society. 

In terms of U.S. foreign policy, images provoke emotional responses established from peoples’ self-sustaining beliefs and value systems. The United States government supports LGBTQ rights abroad. In support of liberal democratic norms of inclusion and with an ethos of democratic ideals backed by human rights doctrines, the U.S. has implemented development initiatives to enhance LGBTQ acceptance worldwide. The issue is whether domestic reflections reflect diplomatic wants. At the same time, there remains a lack of representation of LGBTQ families abroad, whether it be in ambassadorial positions or in dialogue with less accepting countries. National imagery can be a foreign policy tool if LGBTQ families are represented as significantly American. 

Politicians are fundamental to a democratic society and are public leaders in the representation of a nation. Politicians’ actions become political once their actions are perceived by the populace in socialisation and thus, politicians have the moral obligation to prohibit discrimination and political violence with national constitutionally protected justifications. In the same vein, national security efforts should include adherence to inclusivity and adhere to civil rights practised publicly. In present while LGBTQ representation has increased in media outlets, while recent polls from institutions such as The PEW Research Center show that around 55% of Republicans and 83% of Democrats are now accepting same-sex marriage, there continues to exist a support for anti-LGBTQ legislation. It is now more imperative than ever that the national imagery of the represented American people instill an LGBTQ public imagery of social success, acceptance, and leadership to prevent further exclusionary hierarchical violence.