The ICC arrest warrants could change everything, or nothing

Roy Shinar Cohen

After months of investigation and days of speculation, Karim Khan made a dramatic announcement. Khan, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) applied to issue arrest warrants for suspected Israeli and Palestinian war criminals. These criminals are the leaders of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al-Masri (known as Mohammed Deif), and Yahya Sinwar, and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Secretary of Defence Yoav Gallant. 

The two sides of this terrible war are accused of different War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. The accusations against the Israeli side focus on starvation as a weapon of war, the intentional killing of civilians and the blocking of humanitarian aid. Those against Hamas focus on extermination and hostage-taking, including rape and other acts of sexual violence and torture. These are different crimes that have happened in parallel in the months since October 7th.

International arrest warrants were feared in Israel long before this war. In 2009 Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert feared arrest in London on charges of war crimes during a previous war in Gaza, and in 2017 Israel’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs Tzipi Livni feared arrest in Brussels for her role in the same war. In recent weeks, however, the growing fear has been apparent in Netanyahu’s rhetoric and U.S. Republican Congresspeople’s threats to the ICC and Khan. Now, with the two highest-ranking Israeli politicians awaiting arrest warrants, Israeli officials worry Khan will issue further warrant requests against generals.

According to Khan’s statement, he has reasonable grounds to believe Netanyahu and Gallant “bear criminal responsibility for the following war crimes and crimes against humanity”: starvation of civilians as a method of warfare; wilful killing; willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health; intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population; extermination, and/or murder; persecution as a crime against humanity; and “other inhumane acts”. He added that these acts “were committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the Palestinian civilian population pursuant to State policy”. And that “These crimes, in our assessment, continue to this day.”

On Hamas’s side, Khan’s statement details the following War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: extermination; murder; taking hostages; rape and other acts of sexual violence; torture; cruel treatment; other inhumane acts; and outrages upon personal dignity. Khan added that these crimes were “part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population of Israel by Hamas and other armed groups”. And that “Some of these crimes, in our assessment, continue to this day”.

Both Hamas and Israel condemned the arrest warrants against themselves, while hailing those against the other. Hamas stated that the arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant are “too late by seven months” and added that those against its leaders create “an equivalence between the victims and the executor”. In Israel, 106 (out of 120) members of the Knesset (Israel’s parliament) signed a letter slamming the warrants as antisemitic and claiming the Israel Defence Force (IDF) is “the most moral military in the world”. The next day, Gallant posted a similar statement on social media, stressing “the unique humanitarian efforts” taken by the IDF, “the likes of which have not been taken in any armed conflict.”

Several Western countries joined Israel in condemning the ICC. Most notably, President Biden published a statement calling the arrest warrants against Israeli leaders “outrageous”, and emphasized that there is “no equivalence” between Israel and Hamas, reaffirming the United States’s support of Israel. Additionally, Germany stated that the arrest warrants create “a false comparison” between Israel and Hamas. In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Sunak called the arrest warrants “unhelpful” in efforts to stop the war, release the Israeli hostages and enter more humanitarian aid into Gaza. On the other hand, France reaffirmed its support for the ICC and its independence, and Senator Bernie Sanders said Khan is right in requesting arrest warrants for both Hamas and Israeli leaders for credible suspicion of war crimes.

Beyond initial responses and statements, the real question is what, if at all, these arrest warrants will change. Since the beginning of the war, Israel has made clear its intention to find and kill any Hamas leader involved in the October 7th attack, especially Sinwar, Deif, and Haniyeh. Regardless of the arrest warrants against the Israeli officials, it is safe to assume that if any of the wanted Hamas leaders were found by Israeli forces their fate would be sealed long before they appear in court. On the off chance that the Hamas leaders do appear in court, it is nearly impossible to imagine Israel forgoing letting its own courts determine their fate. But, even if Israel did not want to sentence them itself, it would not hand them to the ICC. Handing Sinwar, Deif, and Haniyeh to the ICC would recognise its legitimacy, which Israel cannot due because the ICC wants to arrest its own leaders.

However, discussing Israel’s courts raises the issue of the complementarity principle. According to it, Israeli courts gain priority in dealing with alleged crimes, and if they investigate and hear the cases they are not in the international legal system’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, if Netanyahu and Gallant will be investigated for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity by the Israeli legal system, it may pull the rug from under Khan’s investigation. Yet, considering the public and official positions in Israel regarding the handling of the Gaza War and War Crimes allegations, an Israeli criminal investigation is not likely to happen any time soon.

Hamas’s leaders may not be the only ones who do not receive their day in trial. It is possible to imagine a scenario in which Netanyahu and Gallant avoid their arrest and trial. The ICC does not have its own police force and depends on the 124 countries which ratified the Rome Statute and would make arrests. Israel is not one of those countries. In other words, as long as Netanyahu and Gallant avoid these countries, they would avoid arrest. This dependency on other countries allows many of the ICC’s wanted people to avoid arrest for years, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Russian President, and Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, the Libyan dictator’s son, who has been wanted since June 2011. 

Netanyahu and Gallant could live the remainder of their lives free in Israel and other countries (including the United States, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran). This could be the case in particular if they lose their jobs in the next election, and eventually quit public life. In such a scenario, especially if the war ends and the Israeli Government is replaced, the ICC arrest warrants could remain mostly a symbolic statement against Israel’s actions and policies in the Gaza War.

Yet, the arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant could still be influential even if they avoid trial. Throughout the Gaza War, Israel’s international legitimacy has been eroding: the state stands trial in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) where it is accused of breaking its commitments to the Genocide Convention; the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling for a cease-fire; several countries suspended arms sales to Israel; Western countries sanctioned Israeli settlers for violence against Palestinians; and more. 

The current arrest warrants may signify to the international community as a whole that something has changed and thus legitimise further steps to penalise Israel. For instance, Israel’s leaders being wanted for war crimes and crimes against humanity might incentivise more countries to stop selling arms to Israel or to impose sanctions on the state. Additionally, it could now be more challenging for the United States to veto future United Nations Security Council resolutions calling to end the war. Israel’s security, economic prosperity, and diplomatic ties are all dependent on the West, and a substantial change in attitudes could have severe implications for the State of Israel and its citizens.

These options do not bring us any closer to understanding the true implications of the ICC arrest warrants against Israeli and Hamas leaders. We are left with different possibilities. The ICC’s arrest warrants join the ICJ’s ongoing proceedings against Israel. While the international community attempts to stop the Gaza War and hopes to hold those responsible for its immense suffering accountable, it is not at all clear that it will succeed. On the one hand, officials could be arrested and stand trial for their actions and decisions, and on the other hand, they could take relatively accessible measures to avoid arrest. A third option, however, is that these arrest warrants create a domino effect of cutting support to and possibly sanctioning Israel. As observers, we are left with little to do but wait for the chips to fall. 

A helicopter plummets with Iranian political stability onboard

Roy Shinar Cohen

For several hours on May 19th, all eyes were turned to Iran, waiting quite literally for the fog to clear to get a conclusive answer. Everyone wanted to know whether Iran’s President, Ebrahim Raisi, and Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir Abdollahian died in a helicopter crash in the Arasbaran Forest, near Iran’s border with Azerbaijan. On May 20th, many awoke to an official statement that they had died.

Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, declared Raisi’s “martyrdom” along with Abdollahian and several others. Khamenei explained Iran’s Vice-President will head the Executive Branch until elections will be held, at most within 50 days. Unlike Khamenei, however, many celebrated Raisi’s death. Known as the “Butcher from Tehran”, Raisi is accredited with presiding over mass executions in the late 1980s which Human Rights Watch has declared were crimes against humanity. Additionally, since the inception of Raisi’s tenure as President in 2021, the country has cracked down on protesters, especially during the Mahsa Amini Protests in 2022 and 2023. According to the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), Iranian security forces killed over 500 people and arrested over 18,000 during these protests.

Beyond the question of his memory, which in most places outside Iranian government halls, will likely be negative, we should ask what comes next. Raisi was a conservative politician who was anticipated to replace the 85-year-old Khamenei as Supreme Leader when the time came. Now, his death raises the questions of who will succeed him, in the short-term, and who will succeed Khamenei, an 85-year-old cancer patient, when he dies. Crucially, Raisi died at a highly unstable time for Iran and the region.

Since October, the Middle East has been embroiled in a seemingly ever-escalating conflict. Over the war’s seven months, many of Iran’s proxies attacked Israel from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, and most unnervingly, it has led to substantial escalations in the Israel-Iran conflict after years of “shadow warfare”. On April 1st Israel attacked the Iranian consulate building in Damascus, Syria. The Israeli attack killed Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a senior commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp’s (IRGC) elite Quds Force. In retaliation, on April 13th Iran launched an unprecedented attack which combined hundreds of missiles and UAVs from its territory against Israel. Although the attack was largely thwarted by Israel’s missile defence systems courtesy of its security partnerships with Western and regional states, it is unclear whether a routine of such attacks or ones which include more firepower could be intercepted in the future.

Moreover, Iran has the ability to produce multiple nuclear weapons in a short time. According to the latest report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has enough enriched uranium to 60% for approximately three nuclear weapons, and much more uranium enriched to lower levels. Its breakout time to a weapon is estimated in mere weeks. Additionally, Iran’s missile attack demonstrated to the whole world its capability to launch a large-scale attack on Israel, as well as Israel’s dependency on allies to defend itself. This should be taken very seriously.

Taking all of this into consideration, the current turmoil in the Iranian regime is highly worrying. Although Raisi’s power was debatable, as the Supreme Leader has the final say in Iran, it is safe to say he influenced policy in conservative, anti-liberal ways. Now, it is the Guardian Council’s job to find new candidates who will stand for election quickly. However, at least for now, experts have avoided declaring who will be the next Iranian President. Yet, according to reporting by Al-Jazeera, Mohammad Mokhber and Ali Bagheri Kani, who now serve as the interim President and Foreign Minister, are likely to hold high positions in the new administration. Mokhber and Bagheri Kani are known to have worked closely with Raisi and to be aligned with Khamenei, which is essential for advancing the Iranian system.

According to experts, the two front runners to replace Khamenei when he dies were Raisi and Khamenei’s son Mojtaba, a cleric. Khamenei groomed Raisi to replace him as a hard-liner with experience in the Judiciary and the Executive branch who works well with the IRGC. This plan is now history. The problem with the other option, Khamenei’s son, is the Regime prefers to avoid hereditary transfers of power to prevent further hurting its legitimacy. Although it may be what eventually happens, considering the better option is awaiting its funeral proceedings, some other names have been mentioned. Jason Brodsky, the Policy Director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), mentioned Alireza Arafi, a cleric who rises quickly through the ranks, as another possible successor to Khamenei.

The upcoming weeks in Iran ought to be tense and interesting. The Regime is sure to brutally suppress internal challenges if they arise and be less tolerant of external threats. Regional actors, including Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as Hezbollah and the Houthis, will watch closely to minimize surprises. The comforting news, if there is any in such a story, is that for now, the Iranian Regime considers Raisi’s death the result of a crash during bad weather, not an assassination attempt. If Raisi was assassinated, the culprit risks an all-out war with a nuclear power. Let us hope the most important consequences of this helicopter crash remain the internal power struggles.

Lessons from Khan Younis: Israel’s Catastrophic Failures and the Ruins of Gaza

Tasmir Aziz

The stench of death hovers over Khan Younis, a city in the Southern Gaza Strip. As Israel’s 98th Division forces withdrew on April 7th, ending the siege that began in earnest in December, many residents returned to find most of their city reduced to rubble and their homes destroyed. More than 80% of Khan Younis's buildings are estimated to be destroyed and the rest mostly uninhabitable, according to an initial assessment by the municipality.[1]

As returning residents forage in the rubble of their former homes for their belongings, The Palestinian Civil Defence (PCD), the organization responsible for emergency services and rescue for areas under the authority of the Palestinian Authority, estimates that over 8000 bodies may lie underneath the ruins of the city that had been the site of some of the most intense fighting of the conflict.[2] The PCD also discovered a mass grave dug by the Israeli military near the Nasser Medical Complex containing 180 bodies, including those of elderly women and children, not unlike others discovered near Al Shifa hospital in Gaza city.[3] “In every house there is a martyr, a wounded person. Words cannot describe the magnitude of the devastation and the suffering we experienced. We cried hysterically at the sight of the blood” Qandil, 46, one of those who had come back to Khan Younis, told AFP.[4]

The Siege of Khan Younis: A Resistance that Will Not Die

Despite its technical superiority, the IDF faced significant resistance in Khan Younis and fell prey to numerous successful attacks by the Hamas militia. In early December, Israeli forces began a ground and armored invasion of Khan Younis after a jet hit over 50 targets in the city.[5] By December 10th, the IDF reported that 6 soldiers had been killed with Hamas claiming the partial or total destruction of 24 Israeli military vehicles. The Duvdevan Unit commandos and the Oketz Special Forces K9 unit uncovered a system of tunnels and a drone production facility which they destroyed, severely hampering Hamas’s ability to launch drone strikes. The impact was significant enough for the IDF to announce a reduction in emergency rules for the city of Ashkelon.[6] The operating power of Hamas however continued to pose a problem for the IDF when the al-Qassam brigades carried out numerous successful attacks including multiple incidents where they trapped IDF soldiers in a house.[7]

In January, 21 Israeli soldiers died in an explosion and building collapse, making it the deadliest day for IDF forces since the invasion began.[8] IDF soldiers raided the Nasser hospital the following month, claiming that it contained hostages, though no captives were found.[9] Soon after, the IDF announced that the Hamas Khan Younis Brigade no longer exists but other Hamas-aligned militias continue to prevent Israeli operational control over the area while Hamas continued to report combat effectiveness in the city, a claim validated by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), an American military research Think Tank.[10] On April 6, the al-Qassam Brigades carried out the “Ambush of the Righteous”, a multi-phase attack that claimed the lives of 4 IDF soldiers.[11] The withdrawal occurred the next day.

Israeli Withdrawal: An Admission of Defeat?

Numerous explanations were offered for the withdrawal, including the need to relieve reservists after months of intense fighting and the need to regroup in preparation for the assault on Rafah. But the decision to leave Khan Younis invited criticism and stoked fears of Israeli shortcomings in the war. The senior military correspondent for the rightwing Jerusalem Post, Yonah Jeremy Bob, described it as “admission of failure”.[12] Many expressed skepticisms about Netanyahu’s claims about an impending assault on Rafah with critics speculating that the Prime Minister was seeking to prolong the war at a slower pace for his own political survival. National security minister, Itamar Ben-Gvir, had warned that “if Netanyahu decides to end the war without an expansive assault in Rafah, he won’t have the mandate to serve as prime minister”, a sentiment echoed by his far-right colleague Bezalel Smotrich who immediately called for a Cabinet meeting to discuss the progress of the war.[13]

Simultaneously, the end of the Khan Younis siege indicated to many like Israel Hayom and Ariel Kahana, that a hostages-for-ceasefire deal was imminent.[14] For months, the attack on Khan Younis was touted as a way to force Hamas to release the hostages being held there. Yet, none were found. This points to a wider strategic failure of the Israeli army that has been unable to retrieve all but two hostages through rescue operations with over 50 having died according to Hamas as a result of Israeli attacks[15], including an instance when unarmed Israelis waving white flags and SOS signs were mistakenly shot by the IDF.[16] While the Israelis may claim that the destruction of Hamas is the only way of safely bringing the hostages home, it is clear that this strategy has not yielded success.

But Israel’s catastrophic failures in the war go beyond its inability to bring hostages home. Claims that Israeli victory is but one ground invasion into the densely populated and “final stronghold” of Hamas may be unfounded. Palestinian resistance continues to be stiff across the Gaza Strip. Following the withdrawal, the Israeli army carried out an incursion into the Nuseirat refugee camp where soldiers were ambushed, forcing a withdrawal[17]. After several Israeli soldiers were killed in an ambush in Mughraqa that utilized an unexploded US-made Israeli missile, the Israelis withdrew.[18] And on Sunday, rocket fire from southern Gaza killed four Israeli soldiers at a staging area in the Kerem Shalom military base.[19]

The Attack on Rafah: A Sign of Desperation

One could be forgiven for concluding that the Israelis would prefer to escalate the war rather than secure freedom and safety for its civilians, including the hostages whose plight continues to be stated as a core motivation behind operations that have claimed the lives of over 40,000 Palestinians. Israeli officials continue to describe the necessity of an invasion into Rafah, such as Shimon Boker, Deputy Mayor of Beersheba and closely tied to Netanyahu’s Likud party who went on Israeli TV to say “I think we should have gone into Rafah yesterday…There are no uninvolved [innocent] civilians there….You have to go in and kill and kill and kill.”[20] Over 600,000 children reside in Rafah whose original quarter million population has quintupled with the influx of refugees.[21]

Hamas’s acceptance of the ceasefire deal, one brokered by none other than CIA Director William Burns, may have taken the Israelis by surprise who were quick to reject it.[22] As indirect talks between Hamas, Qatar, Egypt, and the CIA continued, Israeli tanks entered Rafah under the cover of airstrikes.[23] The assault on Rafah is rightly expected to be a bloodbath, a major strategic blunder that will cause a catastrophic loss of innocent life and achieve nothing else for the Israeli army. The question then becomes what does Israel have to gain from the operation in Rafah? One conclusion that can be consistent with the bloodshed that has been witnessed is that the Israelis believe that this assault on civilian life may force the surrender of Hamas, either directly or through the surrender of the Palestinians who will finally turn against the militant group.

But such an outcome may be unlikely. The only thing left to achieve is the continuation of a conflict without which Israel will be left exposed on the world stage. Its strategy of managing the conflict has failed, its hope of integrating with the broader Middle East by bypassing the Palestinian cause is dead, and its prosecution of the war has invited revulsion from even its closest allies. It remains on trial for genocide at the ICJ and awaits a tumultuous political transition following the end of the conflict.

Israel needs this war. It requires an ongoing conflict to avoid the repercussions of its moral and strategic failures. While the surrender and destruction of Hamas may never materialize, Israel’s desperation will continue to claim the lives of countless more Palestinian civilians. As the death toll mounts, paths towards resolution continue to vanish.


Sources

[1] Baba, A. (2024, April 10). A first glimpse of Khan Younis, a Gaza city now lying in ruins. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2024/04/10/1243605152/khan-younis-gaza-residents-return-israel-hamas-war

[2] Jamal, Stephen Quillen, Urooba. "Israel War on Gaza | Live updates | Today's latest from Al Jazeera". Al Jazeera.

[3] Jazeera, A. (2024, April 22). Nearly 200 bodies found in mass grave at hospital in Gaza’s Khan Younis. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/21/nearly-200-bodies-found-in-mass-grave-at-hospital-in-gazas-khan-younis

[4] Beaumont, P. (2024, April 9). Palestinians return to destroyed homes in Khan Younis after Israeli withdrawal. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/08/palestinians-return-khan-younis-israeli-withdrawal-southern-gaza

[5] Reuters. (2024, March 3). Israeli military steps up strikes on Hamas in Gaza's Khan Younis. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-steps-up-strikes-hamas-gazas-khan-younis-2024-03-03/

[6] Seven soldiers die as IDF breaks more Khan Yunis defense lines. The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com. https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-778539

[7] Hamas’s military wing targets Israeli army vehicles, troops in Khan Younis. (n.d.). https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/hamass-military-wing-targets-israeli-army-vehicles-troops-in-khan-younis/3136753

[8] Sky News. (2024, January 23). RPG fired at tank triggers explosion killing Israeli soldiers in Gaza, IDF says. Sky News. https://news.sky.com/story/rpg-fired-at-tank-triggers-explosion-killing-21-israeli-soldiers-in-gaza-idf-says-13054365

[9] (2024, February 15). Israeli troops raid Nasser hospital in southern Gaza. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/15/israeli-troops-raid-nasser-hospital-southern-gaza

[10] Jhaveri, Ashka; Moore, Johanna; Braverman, Alexandra; Carl, Nicholas (9 March 2024). "Iran Update, March 9, 2024" (Historical analysis and research). Institute for the Study of War. Washington, D.C.: ISW Press.

 9 April 2024. ".كمين الأبرار .. القسام يعرض مشاهد لعملية نوعية ضدالاحتلال شرق خانيونس (شاهد)"[11]

[12] Beaumont, P. (2024c, April 9). Palestinians return to destroyed homes in Khan Younis after Israeli withdrawal. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/08/palestinians-return-khan-younis-israeli-withdrawal-southern-gaza

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Hamas Says "Almost 50" Israeli Hostages Killed Since Israel Strikes Began. (n.d.). NDTV.com. https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/hamas-says-almost-50-israeli-hostages-killed-since-israel-strikes-began-4516941                                                            

[16] BBC News. (2023, December 18). Israel Gaza: Hostages shot by IDF put out “SOS” sign written with leftover food. BBC.com. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67745092

[17] Israeli army withdraws from Gaza refugee camp, leaving behind bodies, trail of destruction. (n.d.). https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israeli-army-withdraws-from-gaza-refugee-camp-leaving-behind-bodies-trail-of-destruction/3195189

[18] It’s clearer than ever: Israel’s war has failed catastrophically | The nation. (2024, May 9). The Nation. https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/rafah-invasion-israel-failure/

[19] Ibid.

[20] It’s clearer than ever: Israel’s war has failed catastrophically | The nation. (2024, May 9). The Nation. https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/rafah-invasion-israel-failure/

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] It’s clearer than ever: Israel’s war has failed catastrophically | The nation. (2024, May 9). The Nation. https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/rafah-invasion-israel-failure/

Oxford students join worldwide encampment movement in solidarity with Palestine

 

Roy Shinar Cohen | News Contributor

Early in the morning on May 6th, the historical Pitts River Museum bore witness to raised fences and flags as the Oxford Liberated Zone was established. Students disclosed the news of the camp through social media in a call for solidarity with the people of Palestine. Approximately 100 students gathered to read, chant and draw signs, standing amongst tents of different shapes and colours and unified by flying Palestine flags. Most people wore COVID-19 masks or other facial covers, and many wore keffiyehs - traditional Middle Eastern black and white headdresses mostly associated with the Palestinian cause.

The Oxford Liberated Zone with the backdrop of the Pitt Rivers Museum

Across the camp hang signs and posters reading different messages; “Welcome to the People’s University for Palestine”; “Jews for a free Palestine”; “Israel has destroyed every university in Gaza”, and “Oxford men wrote Balfour. Divest now!”. These signs underscore the general tone of the protests, emphasising two narratives: the protest’s nature as part of a global student movement and the uniqueness of the University of Oxford’s history. Oxford Action for Palestine (OA4P), a newly formed student-led group, created the Liberated Zone. They put out a statement laying out the camp’s demands. Within a day, it received nearly 30 thousand likes on Instagram. It reveals that OA4P joins “145 universities around the globe who refuse to continue business as usual while our institutions profit from and facilitate genocide”. The students’ demands are primarily aimed at their university and are like those made by students around the world.

A poster declaring the protesters’ demands from the University of Oxford

By the entrance to the camp stands a check-in point designed to prevent hostile people from entering. Anyone interested in going in must download “Signal”, an encrypted messaging app, receive a face mask, and confirm they align with “Thawabit”, “the inviolable national rights of the Palestinian people”. Next to the check-in point stands the camp’s list of demands. The protesters marry their rage against the war in general and their anger toward by calling for divestment, overhaul, and a boycott of Israel and its oppression of Palestinians with a call to “Support Palestinian-led rebuilding of education in Gaza”. 

Uniquely, the protesters highlight Oxford’s history, in particular its ties to the British Empire as well as British imperialism and colonialism. Both the chosen location and the language used are directed at this past. First, the OA4P’s statement declares the Pitt Rivers Museum “a materialization of the relationship Oxford has to colonial projects”. The students describe the Museum’s artefacts and display as “erasure, dispossession, scholasticide, epistemicide, and cultural pillaging”. Furthermore, OA4P points a finger at Oxford Graduate Alfred Milner, who served as the chief author of the Balfour Declaration. Fittingly, the students’ sign reads “Oxford men wrote Balfour. Divest now!”

A sign reading “Oxford men wrote Balfour. Divest now!”

The camp is often filled with chants and cheers, some of which have been at the centre of recent controversies. “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free”, “From the sea to the river, Palestine will live forever”, and “Free Palestine, stop the genocide; free Palestine, end apartheid”. The most famous of these chants, “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free”, has long been considered controversial and regarded by some as antisemitic. Recently, the United States House of Representatives has deemed this chant antisemitic by a substantial majority. Earlier, in January 2024, the United Kingdom’s Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, tied the phrase to promoting terrorism and antisemitism.

A Jewish student-protester, Kendall Gardner, rejects notions of antisemitism. Gardner sees the pro-Palestine camp as a “beautiful safe space” and accusations of antisemitism against it and others like it as harmful and distracting attention from “the real antisemitism in the world”. Gardner feels proud to “uphold a legacy of Jewish resistance to oppression wherever it may be. I am proud my ancestors were fighting against these exact same policies, and I can stand here today fighting against genocide”. 

A sign reading “Jews for a free Palestine”

Gardner finds “the way the Jewish community has aligned itself with Israel” troubling. As our interview continued the word “intifada” was chanted. Gardner explained that she could only speak for herself on this matter, but that for her “the word intifada is inspiring”, and she sees its context of Palestinian resistance to “Israel’s 75 years of brutal oppression, apartheid and ethnic cleansing”. Moreover, Gardner explained that she associates “intifada” with her Romanian ancestors’ participation in Ghetto uprisings and resistance to pogroms. However, many students, Jewish and Israeli, understand the word very differently. They see it as a call to arms against them and a glorification of violence against Israel.

Another student, who agreed to speak on the record on the condition of anonymity, thought protesters being tagged as antisemitic is “an inevitability” because it has been “a crucial tool of Israel’s war propaganda machine and Netanyahu’s government”. Yet, she rejected the notion that the camp is antisemitic, hateful, or unsafe to anyone. The same student emphasized the desire to protect Jewish, Muslim, and Palestinian students equally, and the fact that “Jewish students in this University have played a massive role in the struggle against this war”. However, soon after saying this, she added “I personally know Jewish students who will stay far away because they have heard in the media and the news time and again this is an unsafe place for them”.

To those Jewish students who feel unsafe, Gardner says “Rock up and come chat”. She believes it is the role of Jewish people, not “our Palestinian comrades” to try and have conversations about antisemitism, Israel, and Palestine. According to her, the camp is an open space and showing up to talk might change their minds about it and lead to positive exchange.

May 6th, the morning the students chose to vacate their rooms for the tents was also the morning a hundred thousand Palestinians in Rafah were forced to flee again, as Israel’s attack on the city began. And yet, during my visit to the camp, this development, the most substantial in recent months, was missing from the signs, chants, and conversations. When I asked Amy Tess, a DPhil student camping, about this dissonance she emphasized this protest “is not just about Oxford”. According to Tess, student activism is challenging “all the systems of power it is embedded in. That starts with the university and where it’s placing its money, but it’s also pressuring the government”. Tess continues and explains that many of the current protest movements are based on university campuses around the world, and the Oxford camp stands with protests “wherever they may be”. 

When asked about the protective measures – including encrypted messaging and face masks - the camp is taking, Tess explained that “unfortunately, when you speak truth to power, they will come down on you”. She mentions threats such as doxing (exposing people on the internet and urging actions against them), arrests, unjustified searches, and campaigns exposing protesters to get them fired. On the same issue, I spoke with Andrew, a GP who teaches medicine at one of the Oxford Colleges who “deliberately wore a ‘Just Stop Oil’ T-Shirt” because he does not have a Palestine shirt or flag. He joined the protest because “We can’t stand for this nonsense anymore, it's just crazy what’s happening around the world, and this wildfire of protests just spreading is so impressive”. Andrew, who stood out for being much older than most protesters, was also unique for not covering his face. “I am not afraid in the slightest. If they want to pick on me, let’s talk about it face to face, person to person - what’s your problem?”

Like Andrew, nearly 200 of the University of Oxford’s staff have signed an open letter supporting the student camp. The staff members declared they considered the students’ demands “entirely reasonable” given Oxford’s ideals and global leadership and joined in demanding transparency and change regarding financial investments. Additionally, the open letter urged the University to condemn the killing of professors and the destruction of universities, educational institutions, and archives in Gaza. Lastly, they asked the University to “immediately commit resources” to creating opportunities for Palestinian scholars and rebuilding Gaza’s universities.

According to reporting by Cherwell, a spokesperson for the University commented on the camp by saying Oxford respects the students’ and staff members’ right to free expression in the form of peaceful protests. They added a plea to express themselves with “respect, courtesy and empathy”, since “there is no place for intolerance at the University of Oxford”. It should be noted that according to protester Kendall Gardner, who was interviewed for this article, the University and the students have not spoken as of May 6th.

Students do not know when or how the camp will end. They all expressed hope that the University would deliberate and change its financial policy, instead of calling the police. However, they are not optimistic. At the end of the day, the students’ and campers’ eyes are on Gaza. A student mentioned anonymously that he did not know if the camp “will make a difference on the number of bombs that are dropped”. But she hoped it empowers young people and students to feel like they can fight against injustices.

 

Argentina at a crossroads: the 2023 General Election

Luca Venga

A country divided: introducing the Argentine election

Politics has never been as bewildering as it is today. Governments around the world have had to grapple with polarised electorates which can no longer be clearly divided and labelled into opposing camps of the left and the right. Gone are the days of simple bipartisan systems: the rise of candidates who dabble in identity politics has transcended class barriers, dragging a host of entirely novel issues into the political arena. Appeals to the masses and to ‘The Will of The People’ abound on all sides, pitting increasingly hostile factions against each other in ongoing ‘Culture Wars’ that unfold seamlessly across the digital and the physical realm.

But what is left when this supercharged cycle reaches its end, when extremism and violence are commonplace when dialogue is impossible and parties collapse under the weight of their divine-right leaders? What is left when everything burns out? 

The answer is Javier Milei. 

Javier Milei is bidding to be Argentina’s next President. He will face Sergio Massa, the current economy minister and Peronist candidate, in a run-off election on the 19th of November. This should concern people from all corners of the globe: the fact that a candidate like Mr. Milei has a robust chance of capturing the Presidency of a country like Argentina ought to raise alarm bells everywhere. 

Argentina is, in fact, something of a trailblazer as well as a bellwether, and insights into this complex country can be expanded and applied elsewhere. Javier Milei’s meteoric rise is, I believe, symptomatic of the malaise affecting many countries around the world, and thus it can offer us a glimpse at a possible future - a future we should all be invested in.

Days of a Future Past

Argentina was previously a laboratory for political innovation throughout the early 1940s. In those years, Juan Domingo Peron forcefully emerged on the national scene as a political innovator of the first order, upsetting the traditional system and generating an enduring kind of personality cult that still shapes Argentine society. 

Peron can be considered the first, true, modern populist – he commanded widespread support and linked his public and private images closely, mixing the conquering caudillo (strongman) with the benevolent father of the nation’s poor. His personal life spilled into the public, catapulting his second wife Eva Peron (affectionately known as Evita) to national and international fame. 

His economic policies escaped any attempt to be defined, and while they largely reflected a concern with the living conditions of the working classes, Peron ostensibly situated himself as the champion of a ‘third way’ between communism and capitalism, importing elements from fascist corporatism, resolutely sidelining socialists, and pursuing an international policy of strict non-alignment. 

Deposed in a military coup, exiled, and then returned triumphantly to the Presidency for a third mandate, Peron forcefully marked the history of the country and of the whole of South America, offering a blueprint for success that has been adapted and replicated in a variety of circumstances. The Peronist movement has dominated much of Argentina’s political life in the last fifty years, but its enduring appeal has been severely tested by a series of deep economic crises. 

Argentina’s twin nightmares: debt and inflation

It is hard to pin down exactly where Argentina’s economic fortunes began to decline – after all, at various points in the early 20th century, the country was amongst the most advanced and prosperous not just on the continent, but worldwide. 

The late 1990s, however, represented a decisive turning point. Argentina experienced hyperinflation and severe currency devaluation, culminating in the collapse of the Convertibility Plan in 2001, the default of the country’s sovereign debt, and a partial liquidity freeze. This crisis led to widespread social unrest, exemplified in the riots and protests that shook the capital at the turn of the millennium, a sharp increase in poverty levels, and a loss of confidence in the country's financial institutions. The subsequent years were marked by the government’s attempt to implement measures such as debt restructuring, fiscal austerity, and the introduction of a floating exchange rate regime in order to regain the trust of the international financial market and obtain loans from the IMF and other multilateral institutions.

These dynamics – acute crises followed by reconciliatory steps with external forces, which led to a temporary reprieve –played out somewhat cyclically until the onset of COVID-19. The pandemic shifted the equilibrium irreparably, exacerbating economic difficulties and precipitating thousands into poverty. Triple digit inflation broke any remnant of official exchange rates on the Argentine pesos, whose price on the black market is now spiralling inexorably downwards. 

Enter Javier Milei

Amidst such deep economic woes, compounded by the toxic legacy of the military junta, it comes as no surprise that Argentine politics are rife with antagonistic speeches, accusations of corruption or incompetence, and polarizing figures. 

In light of this background, many observers have made sense of Mr. Milei by labelling him as a scion of the Trump-Bolsonaro dynasty, the latest iteration of a phenomenon that has already been observed. They argue that he is but a product of his environment, that the confluence of populist politics and economic suffering was bound to produce such a figure, and that he is rising to fame by borrowing from the playbook of its Brazilian counterpart with an Argentinian tinge. 

Whilst there are certainly merits in such comparisons, I argue that Javier Milei is much more than this, and that he represents an evolution rather than a mere repetition – Like Juan Domingo Peron, he is the herald of a new type of politics. Like Peron, he has conjured a new political stance that is hard to describe or define, one that relies largely on a quasi-messianic belief in his own abilities and is light on specific details.

Self-describing as an anarcho-capitalist, Mr. Milei offers a vision that goes beyond any form of ideology and appeals only to raw, unfiltered emotion. There is no attempt to use reason or logic in any of Javier Milei’s speeches, to clearly propose policies that have been tried and tested or at least well-planned. Instead, preference is given to bold, headline-like statements of intent. 

Abolishing the Argentine central bank, replacing the national currency with the US dollar, legalising the trade of organs – these are only some of the points present in Milei’s programme. They are inflammatory, memorable, and radical. They certainly strike a chord with many frustrated voters who have seen savings wiped out and salaries stagnate and might be tempted by the promises of a fresh start: Mr. Milei, in fact, came first in the Presidential primaries in August, collecting about a third of all votes.

Symptomatic of his disdain for technocratic details, his proposed reduction of the corrupt, inefficient bureaucratic machine of the country is neatly summarised in rounded, impressive figures, but no explanation is ever offered as to how it can be achieved. 

Javier Milei further sets himself apart from conventional politicians by carefully cultivating a revolutionary and unconventional aura that I find reminiscent of Grigori Rasputin. Following in Peron’s footsteps, he amalgamates private elements of his life into his public image – stories abound, for instance, of tarot readings or the cloning of his late dog into five new puppies. His sister, like a modern Evita, is said to be his closest advisor and confidante and manages his political campaign. Were he to be elected, she would be his First Lady. 

His unabashed tirades against opponents or critics – ranging from Pope Francis to the centre-left mayor of Buenos Aires – further endear him to those far-right voters tired of political correctness and ‘woke’ speech. Sectors of the anti-global, anarchist left, meanwhile, are enthralled by the tantalising prospect of getting rid once and for all of the yoke put on the country’s shoulders by international financial institutions. The chief target of their rage is the IMF, with the Fund’s mammoth 44 billion USD loan to the government, the biggest in its history, is widely seen as impossible to repay. 

Mr. Milei finds strength in contradictions rather than being hampered by them. He is not disturbed by the schism separating his supporters, or by the incompatibility of some of his stances. He wants to open up the country to free trade but suggests withdrawing from Mercosur (a free trade bloc comprising Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay). He is a staunch supporter of libertarian beliefs regarding one’s autonomy, but abortion rights do not seem to fall under this umbrella. while another politician might find it hard to explain this seemingly glaring paradox, Javier Milei cuts through such Gordian knots with a chainsaw – the chainsaw he was pictured brandishing at a political rally to symbolise his commitment to drastic cuts in public expenditure. 

In these regards, Javier Milei is unlike any politician I have ever seen take to the world stage. He bears more than a passing resemblance to the populism Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, and Juan Domingo Peron, and indeed borrows elements from these politicians and others besides. But he adds new ones and combines them in an unprecedented cocktail – a poisoned chalice he is offering to voters on the 19th of November. Should he succeed, imitators will take notes and contest elections across Latin America and beyond adopting his tactics and strategies. 

The way forward

The roots of populism grow deep, unnoticed until a leader such as Javier Milei emerges. In the case of Argentina, to understand the rise of such a peculiar, divisive figure, we have to acknowledge the nation's fraught political and economic history. There must be a reckoning with the legacy of Peron and Peronism, as well as increased scrutiny over the nature of domestic and international economic forces in shaping the political sphere. Politics itself should sever its links with populism in a bid to avoid becoming merely the unchecked tyranny of the majority. This is a global task for the century, one that will unfold in many different theatres – but in the case of Argentina, it is especially urgent. 

Argentine voters will be asked to choose in the upcoming weeks. Mr. Massa, for all the faults that can be attributed to him, represents a much more reliable and constructive alternative to Javier Milei. Were the latter to be elected, it is hard to predict what course the country would take – the reaction of international markets and a hostile congress might limit his scope for action, but much damage could still be wrought on the nation by a frustrated President Milei. 

Even if voters reject Mr. Milei, it is troubling enough that Argentina has been pushed this close to the edge of the precipice. 

Global actors from the IMF to neighbouring Brazil ought to be paying attention: they might learn that it is worth exploring new avenues for cooperation rather than sticking to outdated paradigms – those same paradigms that have reduced what once was the 6th largest economic power in the world to a country were about half of the population lives in poverty, that have transformed Buenos Aires from a global hub of the arts to a suffering metropolis where crime is rising and prices increase on a daily basis. 

The local and the international are coming together in Argentina, threatening to create a perfect storm. It is in everyone’s interest to follow this election closely, learning from it to avoid the worldwide rise of a new, uglier tide of populist politics that festers on the votes of the dispossessed, the discontent and the left-behind, tearing down any semblance of order or logic in favour of pure, distilled anger.

Sino–African Relations Going into COP28

Fikayo Akeredolu

The 28th UN Conference of the Parties (COP28) has already been plagued with various controversies. 

There has been displeasure about the climate conference hosted by one of the top producers of fossil fuels and issues relating to COP28 emails. These controversies should not detract from the importance of COP28, especially for countries in the Global South. For all the issues around the annual summit, it is still the largest multilateral forum for dealing with climate change. 

COP28 is of particular significance as it marks the conclusion of the first Global Stocktake, a comprehensive assessment of the progress made in achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement. A synthesis report of key findings showed that the world is far from achieving the Paris Agreement's goals. If action is not taken before the second Global Stocktake in 2028, we may witness the devastating reality of global temperatures soaring beyond 1.5 degrees Celsius. 

For Africa, the situation is critical. Despite its limited contribution to climate change, Africa is the most vulnerable to its impacts under all climate scenarios above 1.5 degrees Celsius. There is a need for urgent multilateral action on mitigation and adaptation to prevent and reverse the consequences of climate change. Africa and its trading partners, of which China is top, must work at COP28 to find solutions adapted for the continent. 

China has the largest economy and is most influential in the multilateral sphere in the Global South. To what extent can it use this leverage to aid Africa’s negotiations at COP? President Xi has also pushed for increased south-south solidarity to help Global South countries multiply their impact on the world stage, ensure their representation in multilateral forums, and foster a fairer and more equitable international economic order. How will China translate this push into action for Africa at COP28?

Financing Adaptation & Mitigation 

One central theme that continues to arise in the climate conversation is the issue of financing for African countries to fund adaptation and mitigation efforts. To implement their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, African countries will need $2.8 trillion between 2020-2030. However, the continent only receives annual climate finance flows of $30 billion. At the recently concluded Africa Climate Week, African leaders demanded a scaling up of climate finance and operationalizing the loss and damage fund agreed on during COP27. 

China has featured heavily in the debate between Africa and Western nations over financial help to countries suffering the effects of climate change. During COP27 in Egypt, China lent its voice to support the demand of developing countries for a loss and damage fund from developed countries. China's then-special envoy for climate change, Xie Zhenhua, made it clear that China has no obligation to provide loss and damage funding. Still, he emphasised China’s willingness to support loss and damage efforts with other developing countries through Global South cooperation. He did not provide exact details, but China continues to push for South-South cooperation, which includes a climate cooperation fund. 

China has always pushed the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. The idea is that developing countries (including China) should share responsibilities for developing and adopting information communication and scientific research while not incurring any economic burdens or requirements to reduce energy use.

Going into COP28 in the UAE, we can expect China to continue advocating for this principle.  As calls in the Global South get louder for changes to the multilateral financial system and accountability from their developed counterparts, concerted and targeted Sino–African cooperation could lead to the activation of the loss and damage fund. It could also push developed countries to fulfil their COP15 still unfulfilled pledge of $100 billion per year for climate efforts in developing countries. 

Discussing Africa’s Debt Crisis

Another critical area for assessing Sino–African relations going into COP28 is Africa’s worsening debt burden. 

Africa’s debt is at its highest level in over a decade. 49 African countries owe 39% of their debt to multilateral institutions, 35% to private creditors (excluding Chinese private creditors), and 12% of the debt burden on the continent is owed to China and Chinese lenders. As a result of COVID-19, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and soaring inflation, African countries have had to take on even more debt, and now 21 low-income African countries are either bankrupt or at high risk of debt distress. 

Climate finance has typically been offered through debt-creating means. Climate emergencies exacerbate these problems because they have little or no option other than borrowing to deal with recovery and reconstruction costs after an extreme climate event or environmental hazard. Using loans and other forms of debt to carry out climate financing will reduce a country’s capacity for fiscal stability and debt sustainability, thus worsening the debt crisis on the continent. This means many countries on the continent are struggling with limited monetary and fiscal space, compounding debt amid competing development priorities. 

In an ideal world, COP28 could provide a platform for Africa’s creditors to discuss resolving the debt issue without impacting mitigation and adaptation efforts on the continent. In January 2023, China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated his country’s commitment to supporting the UAE’s goal of ensuring COP28 responded to “developing countries’ core concerns.”

Conclusion

Almost eight years after the Paris Climate Agreement was signed, the global community is not on track to meet its target of limiting global warming. Getting the Global Stocktake right is pivotal for COP28 and sets the stage for future stocktakes and climate action over the next decade. For China and Africa, which account for approximately 36% of the global population, the stakes are even higher as some countries already face climate change's consequences. 

As China’s President Xi continues to push for increased Global South cooperation, China’s willingness to push the agenda of countries in the region will be vital to achieving Chinese foreign policy goals. Going into COP28, Chinese and African negotiators have the opportunity to work together to push for funding for adaptation and mitigation without exacerbating debt issues.